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This study is a comparative examination of three contemporary systems of contemplative 
practice – mindfulness, christfulness and centering prayer. The texts of these systems of 
contemplative practice will be analyzed, and the contemplative practices described therein 
will be practiced as well. Through such an approach the traditional dichotomy between 
observer/practitioner and insider/outsider will be challenged. An assumption of this study 
shall be that such an approach is thought to enable new perspectives to arise, and are therefore 
considered worthwhile.  
The conceptual category of techne will also be analyzed, and thereafter applied as a lens 
through which to study contemplative practices. Friedrich von Hügel’s philosophy of religion 
will also be used throughout. The main purpose of the study is to provide an anatomy of 
contemplative practice.  
In these days when contemplative practices are starting to go mainstream and the hype of 
mindfulness can be felt throughout the Western world, there is a need to map and elucidate 
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Approximately 2500-2000 years ago, or possibly even earlier, some groups of the human 
species made a monumental discovery. They discovered that the careful regulation of 
attention, of breathing and of movement, and abstaining from basic bodily needs like food, 
drink and sex all seemed to affect their psyches and effect certain peculiar responses in their 
experience of the world. They discovered that through the practice of different techniques, 
through discipline, they could transform themselves. Consequently, elaborate systems of 
attention-regulating technologies (today often called contemplative) and of magical 
procedures to control the world (sometimes called rituals) were expounded and gradually 
systematized, eventually forming into major religions like e.g. Jainism, Buddhism and 
eventually Daoism. At least this is the picture presented by ancient sources from India and 
China if taken at face value
1
. Today, there is a growing resurgence and popularization going 
on about the effectiveness of inner training – i.e. of attention regulation. Concepts like 
“meditation,” “contemplation,” “mindfulness,” and “neuroplasticity” have achieved 
mainstream usage in the West. This study is part of an attempt to examine and clarify what 
lies behind this resurgence, by analyzing the very structure of attention-regulation 
technologies – what I shall call contemplative practice.  
My approach will be comparative and threefold. First, I will examine and trace the conceptual 
development of the Greek concept techne (usually translated as “craft” or “art”), and use this 
concept as a lens for understanding particular religious practices. This might seem novel and a 
bit far-fetched, but in fact it is neither. Techniques of all kinds are found throughout the 
history of religions – techniques of changing or influencing nature (rituals), techniques of 
self-transcendence (contemplative-mystical), techniques of healing (shamanism), etc. The 
religious expert or specialist is often someone with a certain skill or set of skills related to 
such techniques, possessing technical know-how and often a toolbox from which he draws his 
expertise. Thus techne has been used in the past, emically, by great thinkers such as e.g. Plato, 
the Stoics and Proclus, in the sense of a specific art-form or craft that must be mastered
2
. 
More recently, techne has also been used etically, implicitly by researchers such as Eliade
3
, 
                                                 
1
 As shall be examined later, the presentation and interpretation of ancient texts should not be taken at face 
value, but must rather be contextualized before we can make sense of them. See e.g. (Sharf 1995) 
2
 For more on Plato’s and the Stoics’ usage of techne, see chapter 3. Proclus usage is in relation to ritualistic-
magical procedures (theurgy), which he calls hieratike techne. See (Tanaseanu-Döbler 2013) 
3
 In his analyses of techniques of yoga (Eliade 1969) and techniques of shamanism (Eliade 1964) 
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and explicitly by Heidegger and Foucault
4
. Examining further the meanings and applications 
of that concept, then, is in fact a dive into the past, and not completely unprecedented. 
Second, using techne as a research category, I shall examine through my understanding of that 
concept three texts that present contemplative techniques that are practiced today, by working 
out a comparative analysis. As such, I choose to delimit my study of techne to its 
contemplative variants found in the contemporary world, and will therefore not include 
ritualistic, cultic or shamanistic material in my analysis, even though these are certainly 
relevant for a more complete understanding of techne’s relation to religious practice. Thus, I 
will focus on one set of religious practice – i.e. contemplative practice – by comparing three 
cases through the lens of techne. Third and finally, I will test out the contemplative practices 
described in the texts, as a way of conducting participant observation.         
1.1 Research Questions and Structure 
My main research question will be: to what extent can contemporary forms of contemplative 
practice be understood as a form of techne (art or craft)?  
Before I can start examining that question, I need to first elaborate what techne is all about, 
and secondly I must establish a workable definition of contemplative practice. I have 
therefore structured this dissertation in three parts. In chapter 2, I delimit the objects of study 
and summarize earlier relevant research on contemplative technologies as well as the 
theoretical lenses through which I will view the material (chapter 3). In chapter 4 I try a 
somewhat superficial attempt at Begriffsgeschichte by using and tracing the history of techne 
as a conceptual tool for understanding contemplative practice specifically, and religion 
generally. In this chapter I will also work out a definition of contemplative practice, and the 
theories of Friedrich von Hügel on religion and mysticism will also be emphasized. In 
chapters 5-7, I present the source material through the theoretical lenses elaborated in chapters 
2-4. The material in these case studies chapters will be presented using their own words, 
unless I explicitly state otherwise. Chapters 8 and 9 consist of an analysis, comparison and 
critique of the source material and my approaches to it, before I conclude the study in chapter 
10.       
                                                 
4
 Heidegger explicitly discussed techne in his great essay on technology (Heidegger 1954), and Foucault relates 
it to what he calls “technologies of the self” especially in his later works. (Foucault et al. 1988) and (Foucault et 




1.2 Motivation and Relevance 
My motivation for this study is both personal and academic. In my adolescence I practiced 
and experimented for several years with many different techniques of attention regulation, 
most of which resembled mindfulness practices as described in chapter 5. I did this because I 
wanted to see if they worked. I was attracted to the idea that metaphysical questions were 
supposedly up for investigation through different types of practices. Here was a possible 
procedure through which I could supposedly investigate the nature of reality. Through such 
practicing I experienced a number of interesting phenomena, but nothing too out of the 
ordinary. The experiences did however ingrain in my mind that a lot was possible through the 
“simple” regulation of one’s own attention. This led to my academic interest in religion in 
general, and contemplative practices in particular. I am convinced that more research, 
scientific and humanistic, on mapping and uncovering contemplative experiences, practices 
and their effects will provide great discoveries within a variety of fields – e.g. medicine, 
psychology, neuroscience, linguistics. It is interesting to note that despite the long history of 
contemplative traditions throughout the world, there is still little scholarly understanding of 
what goes on in a practitioners psyche, and why. However, with the advent of the 
participatory turn (see chapter 2), this has already begun to change. I hope this small 
contribution might be a tiny step in that direction.       
1.3 Sources and Limitations 
My primary source material consists of three manuals of three distinct contemplative systems 
of practice: mindfulness, christfulness and centering prayer. The former is Buddhist-Secular, 
the latter two are Christian. These were chosen based on their popularity, apparent technical 
similarities, and being available in languages I master. In the spirit of the participatory 
subjective anthropotechnic turn (see chapter 2), I shall test out the practices explicated in 
these textual sources, and review how such practicing effects my reading and understanding 
of the source material. This study is in other words a study of text and practice, of 
interpretation and experience. I will focus exclusively on contemplative practices and their 











2 Theory and Method 
A number of concepts will be applied throughout this study, some of which denote numerous 
meanings. For this reason, I will establish some theoretical preliminaries to clarify how I 
understand and intend to use these terms throughout this dissertation. For coherency, my own 
conceptualizations of techne, technification, technical mysticism, religion and contemplative 
practice will be explored together in chapter 4. 
2.1 Secularization and Weberian Disenchantment 
Secularization is a multifaceted and multi-dimensional concept of modernity that needs 
clarification. I will use this analytical term based mainly on the theories of sociologist of 
religion Karel Dobbelaere.
5
 According to him, secularization could be understood in three 
senses: (i) referring to the increasing functional differentiation of society into distinct spheres 
(that used to be primarily under religious leadership and direction, like education, science, 
legislation, health care, etc.)
6
; (ii) referring to a process of presumed decline in religious 
activity (e.g. worship attendance) and in adherence to religious teachings and beliefs (e.g. 
belief in an after-life, or a deity); and finally (iii) referring to changes within the religious 
economy. Such changes can mean that religious communities alter their character, standards, 
even values, to accommodate a new rapidly-changing religious environment or economy – 
e.g. Scandinavian Christian congregations re-focusing on teaching practical contemplative 
techniques in an attempt to halt the drastic decline in church attendance and in answer to a 
critique of a too theological-intellectual, spiritually poor traditional church at the expense of a 
living practical experience-oriented church (Christfulness and Areopagos’ meditation project 
in Norway are but two examples that will be addressed fully in chapter 6).  
Weber’s famous view on the disenchantment of the world [Entzauberung der Welt] will also 
be applied in my study. Disenchantment is for Weber a central feature of modernity. In 
Science as a Vocation (based on his 1919 lecture), Weber writes: “The fate of our age, with 
its characteristic rationalization and intellectualization and above all the disenchantment of the 
                                                 
5
 (Dobbelaere 1987) 
6
 (Hammer 2001, pp. 30-31) 
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world, is that the ultimate, most sublime values have withdrawn from public life…”7 A de-
spiritualization or de-mystification of the public sphere is on full display. A central tenet of 
the modern age, according to Weber, is the belief that there is essentially “no mysterious, 
incalculable powers at work, but rather that one could in principle master everything through 
calculation. (…) One need no longer have recourse to magic in order to control or implore the 
spirits.”8 Weber’s notion of disenchantment can be interpreted as a critique of one of the side-
effects of scientific progress and the increased bureaucratization of society – a cold 
meaninglessness which, at the expense of the existential why, locomotives forth in the name 
of efficiency and the productive what. I interpret Weber’s concept of disenchantment in the 
abovementioned sense. 
2.2 Qualitative methods 
Qualitative research in religion has as its main aims to understand and interpret religious 
phenomena in their natural surroundings, and does not just explore the what, when and where 
like in quantitative research, but also its how and why. As such, my observations and 
conclusions will perhaps indicate correlations, but never causation, and must be considered 
speculative and hypothetical rather than categorical and definitive. Qualitative methods that 
are used to collect and analyze data can e.g. be ethnographic, case-studies (e.g. fieldwork with 
interviews and/or observation), or hermeneutical. The latter two methods – i.e. case-studies 
and hermeneutical approaches – will be used in this dissertation. I will explore the 
explanatory potential and limitations of these methods, and will in the following evaluate both 
their strengths and weaknesses.    
2.2.1 Mystical Hermeneutics and reflexivity 
Hermeneutics is a philosophy of interpretation and also the analysis of the principles of 
interpretation (i.e. method). A hermeneutic process involves readings that move back and 
forth between single parts of the text and the horizon of the text, and between the text and its 
contexts. This moving about is called the hermeneutical circle.
9
 
                                                 
7
 The quote continues: “…either into the transcendental realm of mystical life or into brotherhood of 
immediate personal relationships between individuals.” See (Lassman, Velody, and Martins 1989, p. 30) 
8
 (Lassman, Velody, and Martins 1989, 13-14) 
9
 (Stausberg and Engler 2011, p. 275) 
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Mystical hermeneutics is a term proposed by Kripal, and involves exploring how a text 
performs what the “mystical” authors want to say, “how they engage in different rhetorics of 
secrecy to hide or camouflage (…), and how rhetorical occurrences of these mystical meaning 
events might then occur to the readers of their texts.”10 In my evaluation of three different 
contemplative sources, I will use a somewhat similar approach to what Kripal is here 
describing. I will first read the primary texts, then try out the practices described therein, and 
then re-read the texts to see if any new insight appear from such a “mystical” hermeneutics. 
My use of the term differs slightly, then, from Kripal’s usage, as I am rather interested in 
exploring how the hermeneutical circle – of reading, practicing, re-reading – influences the 
interpretive process. I found that upon my re-reading, after practicing the contemplative 
practices, I was more sympathetic to the texts. This is not necessarily wrong, but needs to be 
treated reflexively, as unrestricted hermeneutical freedom represents a serious limitation to 
the hermeneutical method, which can lead to bizarre interpretations.   
Cultivating a conscious awareness of how the researcher is part of the knowledge production 
process is what is usually referred to as reflexivity.
11
 Flood defines reflexivity as “the ability 
of a researcher, or indeed as a strategy embedded within method, to become aware of the 
contexts of research and the presuppositions of the research program.”12 Reflexivity allows 
the researcher not only to treat things critically and reflect over one’s own possible 
presuppositions, but also enables the researcher to be critical of the critical evaluation of said 
presuppositions. Specifically, this means that it can be possible for the researcher to uncover 
personal biases and hidden agendas concerning research design. It also means that method can 
move away from the façade of neutrality and objectivity, to a recognition of agency
13
 and 
contextuality. Reflexivity is related to hermeneutics in the sense that both are abilities of the 
researcher to become aware of his own biases, and both emphasize the contextual nature of 
knowledge production. Reflexivity can therefore work as a safeguard against possible 
exaggerations or hidden agendas in my use of “mystical” hermeneutics.  
 
     
                                                 
10
 (Kripal 2001, 8) 
11
 (Stausberg and Engler 2011, 67) 
12
 (Flood 1999, 35)  
13
 (Flood 1999, 38) 
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2.2.2 Fieldwork – Participant Observation 
A significant portion of the source material for this dissertation will be based on my own 
participation in two 7-week intensive summer courses at Brown University during the 
summer of 2013. There, I attended two classes: one was called Meditation and the Brain, and 
focused on recent neuroscientific research; the other was called An Introduction to 
Contemplative Studies, and focused on mainly Buddhist and Daoists contemplative texts and 
practices. These courses, being intensive summer courses, held two 3 hour seminars per week. 
Also, they both included what was called med labs – meaning meditation labs. The med labs 
entailed going to a nice neutral-looking chapel at 9 am, before the seminars, and meditate 
there for 1 hour to 1 hour 15 min per session under the guidance of an experienced instructor. 
Then, a short break would commence followed by the seminar, in which we would go through 
the textual and historical background for the different meditation/contemplative practices we 
had just practiced in the med lab. After each med lab, we would write down our reflections 
about the experiences from the practices and journal our contemplative development. This 
means that for four days a week, I meditated at least 1 hour, meaning at least 4,5 hours of 
contemplative practicing per week.  
During this study, mainly in 2013, I practiced mostly the mindfulness techniques (two 
months), while centering prayer and Christfulness practices have been practiced sporadically 
for a few weeks. In conducting fieldwork of this type, it is important to treat my non-textual 
source material – i.e. my personal experience with contemplative practice – with a high 
degree of reflexivity. Therefore, I will be explicit whenever I am referring to insights or 
opinions based on my personal practice experience. The idea is that my practice
14
 will inform 
and hopefully elucidate my interpretive approaches to the source material. The strength of this 
approach involves gaining an insider-perspective on phenomena usually relegated to texts or 
phenomenological analysis and bracketing of other peoples’ experiences. The weakness or 




                                                 
14
 Or technical mysticism, as I call experimenting with contemplative practices. See chapter 4.4 
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2.2.3 Evaluating Good Research – Reliability and Validity 
Reliability refers to the extent of consistency and stability of the research data, whereas 
validity is the extent to which the phenomenon being studied is addressed properly in 
research.
15
 These terms are, in other words, criteria of criticism and excellence. Validity raises 
the question of whether we can be sure that we are researching what we think we are 
researching – whether the indicators we use (our methodology) accurately reflects the 
concepts it is supposed to reflect. Concerns for reliability questions whether the findings 
would be different if the data had been collected from different source material (e.g. if I used 
interviews instead of hermeneutical analysis) and whether another researcher evaluating the 
same data using the same theories would come to the same conclusions as myself. Further 
questions regarding validity could be whether the findings would relate to people’s ordinary 
lives outside the confines of the study itself (e.g. whether Christfulness is relevant for not just 
practitioners mentioned in the sources, but for other Christians too); whether the findings can 
be generalized across the social contexts studied (e.g. whether the technical similarities 
between centering prayer and mindfulness can withstand academic scrutiny); and whether the 
data is sufficiently relevant for the object of study
16
 (do the three contemplative practices in 
this study provide enough data to construct an anatomy of contemplative practice?). 
Briefly, it should be noted that the concepts of reliability and validity have been criticized 
because of their implicit linkage to (post) positivistic views of methodology
17
 and science, 
and failure to recognize “the situated and co-constructed nature of truth.”18 Critical voices 
from ethnic and feminist perspectives emphasize concepts such as accountability, dialogue, 
caring and reflexivity as better standards for assessing good research.
19
 According to this 
critique, un-reflexive criteria of excellence in pursuing norms of objectivity can easily (and 
without knowing it) support the status quo and those in a position of advantage, at the expense 
of the disadvantaged. A famous proponent of this feminist critique maintains that instead, the 
social researcher should ask passionately, analyze critically and disseminate empoweringly.
20
 
Reflexivity is again highlighted as a remedy for methodological shortcomings and weak 
research designs. 
                                                 
15
 (Stausberg and Engler 2011, 7-20) 
16
 (Stausberg and Engler 2011, 8) 
17
 (Zammito 2004) 
18
 (Stausberg and Engler 2011, 9) 
19
 (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 24) 
20
 (Sprague 2005, 199-200) and (Stausberg and Engler 2011, 55) 
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3 Historical Overview of Research on 
Contemplative Technologies 
3.1 The Academic Study of Asceticism 
Asceticism has often been used synonymously with negative connotatives like self-torture, 
religious madness, spiritual masochism, etc. – especially during and after the Enlightenment. 
Recent research however, has challenged the earlier predominating negative view of ascetic 
practice. Indeed, the academic study of asceticism is relatively new. Still to this day, there is 
no definitive cross-cultural work on asceticism. Asceticism is a term that, like religion, has 
proven hard to define by scholars and researchers. It comes from the Greek askesis, meaning 
“training, exercise, practice,” and denotes a form of inner training one subjects oneself to 
through a variety of regulatory attention practices, and often also abstentions from activities 
and obligations of the social sphere (like reproduction, normal food, etc.). Just as with 
research on mysticism and contemplation, the academic study of asceticism has seen a 
marked increase of interest over the last two decades. The perspectives range from those 
focusing on asceticism as self-denial, self-sacrifice and pathological self-scrutiny as the 
essential factors (negative), to those seeing ascetic practice as being in the service of 
liberation, empowerment and spiritualization (positive).
21
 Interestingly, we can find the same 
thinkers on both sides of the discussion, some starting out on the negative side of the 
spectrum, then ending up on the more affirmative side later on in their research.
22
  
On the negative side, Nietzsche stands out, even though his seemingly contradictory views 
can be interpreted as being juxtaposed and coherent. On the one hand, he directly discusses 
the meaning of what he calls the “ascetic Ideal” in the Genealogy of Morals, in its third essay, 
basically arguing that this ideal is constituted by a pathological denial of self and the world, 
while still being the highest form of will to power. On the other hand, as both biographer 
Walter Kaufmann and Tyler Roberts note, Nietzsche himself was an ascetic, and wrote 
                                                 
21
For examples of this more positive understanding of asceticism, see (Wimbush and Valantasis 1995) and 
(Sloterdijk 2013) 
22
 Foucault is a good example of this, which will be briefly illustrated below. 
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sympathetic lines about asceticism on several occasions.
23
 Further, Roberts illustrates some 
other critical voices and argues that       
since the Enlightenment, it [asceticism] has become a pivotal term for comprehensive critiques of 
Western culture: Weber finds in the inner-worldly asceticism of Puritanism the mechanism of 
modernity’s `iron cage´; Foucault argues that the monastic cell is reinstituted in the modern prison and 
factory; feminist philosopher Mary Daly identifies asceticism as the `sadospirituality´ with which 
patriarchy has formed the world’s major religious traditions.24  
Hence, it is easy to see how negative connotations to askesis have been prevalent among 
scholars over the last century.  
Of the more positive and (in some cases) recent contributions, asceticism has been viewed as 
diversely as: the most potent form of will to power humanity has yet discovered and “a 
gymnastics of the will”25 (Nietzsche);  a “methodical procedure for achieving religious 
salvation” (Weber); a self-forming activity and the resulting changes that one makes to 
oneself in order to become an ethical subject (Foucault); a structure of compensation, “ `the 
cultural element´ in culture, and (…) any act of self-denial undertaken as a strategy of 
empowerment or gratification” (Harpham); as “performances designed to inaugurate an 
alternative culture, to enable different social relations, and to create a new identity” 
(Valantasis)
26; and as a “self-doubling,” as an inner secession through which the ascetic self 
separates itself from the former life of norms and habit, creating a new subjectivity by means 
of exercises
27, and as “the methods of mental and physical practicing by which humans from 
the most diverse cultures have attempted to optimize their cosmic and immunological status 
in the face of vague risks of living and acute certainties of death” 28 (Sloterdijk).      
Weber’s thoughts on asceticism are part of his sociological theory and understanding of the 
history of economics and the rise of capitalism – accordingly, he devised two categories of 
asceticism: world-rejecting (salvation is achieved by rejecting the world) and innerwordly 
                                                 
23
 Nietzsche’s desire for a rebranding of asceticism can be seen here: “I also want to make asceticism natural 
again; in place of the aim of denial, the aim of strengthening; (…) an experiment with adventure and arbitrary 
dangers.” (Roberts 1996, p. 406). His deep admiration for asceticism is best expressed in the following quote: 
“The most spiritual human beings, as the strongest, find their happiness were others would find their 
destruction; in severity towards themselves and others, in attempting; their joy lies in self-constraint; with 
them asceticism becomes nature, need, instinct. They consider the hard task a privilege (..).” (Roberts 1996, p. 
426)  
24
 (Roberts 1996, 403) 
25
 (Roberts 1996, 405) 
26
 (Wimbush and Valantasis 1995, 544-551) 
27
 (Halsall and Brown 2013, 243) 
28
 (Sloterdijk 2013, 10 & 233) 
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(salvation is achieved through participation in the world, but while rejecting the institutions of 
the world) asceticism.
29
 Foucault, throughout and especially towards the final years of his life, 
would increasingly turn his attention toward the importance of ascetic practice and its relation 
to the formation of the self. Indeed, he even reconceived his original project on sexuality as 
part of a “general history of the `techniques of the self.´ ”30  
Harpham and Valantasis offer more refined conceptions. Their notions of asceticism include 
recognition of the social dimension of ascetic practice, as well as performativity and agency 
in the context of repetition. Flood makes the case that asceticism is always religious, that it 
must have a sacred origin (either deeply engrained in tradition or ritual, or radically opposed 
to it, as a reaction), and defines it as an “erosion of individuality through the act of will”31 
practiced within a religious tradition. Indeed, some of the most central issues in research 
gravitate around whether asceticism is against, of, beyond, a transformer of, or having a 
mutual paradoxical relationship with, – culture. Kaelber argues that these five categories of 
asceticism are helpful in comprehending it as a socio-cultural phenomenon, although only for 
heuristic purposes.
 32
 Kaelber’s five-fold typology will be helpful when I later analyze the 
case studies in part III, as I argue that they can all be seen in the fifth sense – i.e. as practices 
that (ideally) work as transformers of culture. 
    
3.2 The Academic Study of Mysticism 
For an informed study of what contemplative practices might be, I need to survey the vast 
research literature on mysticism. “Mystical” and “contemplative technique” is sometimes 
used interchangeably, so it is useful to investigate what mysticism is. What I give an account 
of here must necessarily be limited to examples most relevant for my project, which is to find 
out what might define a contemplative practice.  
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 (Weber and Aut 1963, p. 164) Weber’s conception of innerwordly asceticism helped him explore the 
relationship “between the development of the work force, the valuation of wealth and material good in the 
Protestant Reformation; the Protestant concept of a vocation to live in the world (as opposed to those Catholic 
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p. 545) and also (Weber and Tawney 1930, p. 132) 
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 (Foucault et al. 1988, p. 8). This is especially noticeable in his later works (Foucault et al. 1988), (Foucault 
1986) and (Foucault et al. 2005). These later works are part of a project in which Foucault’s aim is to establish a 
form of `non dogmatic normativity´ compatible with ethical freedom.  
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 (Flood 2004, p. 212) 
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“Mysticism” and “mystical experience” is a Western construction. The noun “mysticism” first 
appeared in the middle of the 18
th
 century, seemingly at that time to disparage religious 
fanatics in France
33
. Before that time, it was mainly used as the adjective mystical in mystical 
theology. As one of the intellectual languages of power changed in the turn to the 20
th
 century 
from theology to psychology, mysticism was first studied cross-culturally by William James, 
the American philosopher-psychologist. He published The Varieties of Religious Experience 
in 1902, and argued that the collective religious experiences of individuals were at the heart of 
all religions. Further, he argued that a subset of religious experience, mystical experiences, 
could be identified by the presence of four marks: 1) ineffability (they defy description), 2) 
noetic quality (“states of knowledge full of significance and importance”); 3) transiency (they 
end quickly and cannot be sustained for long); and 4) passivity (the feeling of suspension of 
one’s own will, even when one has taken steps to cultivate a mystical state)34. Importantly, 
James goes on to identify another crucial element: the transformative element of mystical 
experience. One is never the same after, according to James
35
. A Jamesian perennialist view 
of mystical experience as universal and similar cross-culturally predominates mysticism 
research until 1978, when it is challenged by Steven Katz
36
. A debate between so-called 




As to specific research into contemplative/mystical techniques, Eliade stands out with his 
analyses of yogic and shamanistic practices
38
. Daniel Brown provides an excellent typology 
of meditative states based on a cross-cultural study, identifying six major stages of practice: 
“1) Preliminary Ethical training, 2) Preliminary Mind/Body training, 3) Concentration With 
Support, 4) Concentration Without Support, 5) Ordinary Insight Meditation, 6) Extraordinary 
Mind and Enlightenment.”39 I will come back to this typology in chapter 8, in my analysis of 
the source material. Other studies, often informed by personal practice, include Katsuki 
Sekida’s masterpiece on Zen training40, and the more recent research articles and cultural 
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 (Wulff 2014, 369) 
34
 (James 2008 [1902], 267) 
35
 (James 2008 [1902], 299) 
36
 (Katz 1978) 
37
 The main proponents in the different camps being Katz on the contextualist side: (Katz 1983), (Katz 1992), 
(Katz 2000), versus Forman on the perennialist side: (Forman 1990) and (Forman 1998).  
38
 (Eliade 1969) and (Eliade 1964). 
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 (Brown 1986, 223) 
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 (Sekida 1975) 
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histories of meditation edited by Halvor Eifring
41. Eifring’s definition of meditation as 
“attention-based techniques for inner transformation”42 will be developed further in chapter 4. 
There are, finally, a growing number of neuroscientists who are studying techniques of 
attention-regulation through the methods of neuroscience. This change of focus among 
researchers illustrates how neuroscience has replaced psychology as one of the dominant 
discourses of explicating mystical experiences and techniques. So how can neuroscientists 
study religious and contemplative-mystical experiences?  
First, the neuroscientist can study the relationship between the electrical charges in the brain 
(measured by electroencephalography, EEG) and meditative states. Second, he can utilize 
brain imaging techniques to map out the cerebral functions during religious experiences, 
which has been done in the past during various motor, behavioural and cognitive tasks.
43
 
Third, some neuropsychologists have tried to construct neuropsychological models of 
spiritual experience, examining the role of particular parts of the brain such as the temporal 
lobes, the frontal lobes, the thalamus, the parietal lobe, the basal ganglia, and also “the 
autonomic nervous system, or some integrated function of a number of brain structures.” 44  
All these models can be illustrative for studying religious phenomena. A recently new 
interdisciplinary field of study, Neurotheology, provides an accessible introduction to the 
ways of studying religious phenomena neuroscientifically. Neurotheology is a “unique field 
of scholarship and investigation that seeks to understand the relationship between the brain 
and theology, and more broadly between the mind and religion.”45 Although the field has 
been accused of theological dishonesty and a not-uncommon Christian apologetic bias 
constantly found in the field of “religion (or Christianity) and science”, Newberg, who is one 
of the more serious neurotheological representatives, makes a convincing case for the 
seriousness and the academic scope of this incipient field by avoiding the common biases just 
mentioned in his great book, Principles of Neurotheology (2012). 
Neuroimaging techniques such as single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), 
positron emission tomography (PET), and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) can 
all contribute to explore cerebral function during contemplative experiences, for example 
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 (Eifring 2010), (Eifring 2013), (Eifring 2014) 
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 (Eifring 2014, 1) 
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 (Newberg 2010, 168-169) 
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 I(Newberg 2010, 169)  
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 (Newberg 2010, 1) 
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during prayer or meditation. These imaging techniques can allow, and has indeed allowed, for 
the uncovering of complex neural networks and phenomenological relationships. PET-
imaging shows that “the themes of experimental phenomena are correlated with the functions 
of the parts of the brain most metabolically active.”46 Michael Persinger, in his research 
evaluated by Anne Runehov, utilizes PET-imaging, with the intention of observing parts of 
the brain that have changed neural activity, compared to baseline (starting point), during some 
experience
47
. Functional brain imaging techniques may be extremely useful in detecting 
neurophysiological changes associated with most spiritual practices (at least the ones 
involving some kind of activation, meaning most of them) and their concomitant 
experiences.
48
 “PET and SPECT can also be utilized to explore a wide variety of 
neurotransmitters systems within the brain such as dopamine, serotonin, or endorphins.”49 
Despite all that these techniques can show, we must always keep in mind that they, like all 
techniques and methods for intellectual enquiry, are limited. These specific imaging 
techniques are limited in the sense that they can interfere with the normal environment of the 
contemplative practice, as being confined to an uncomfortable narrow scanner and suffering 
exposure to high-pitch noise could adversely affect the subject’s ability to “perform” his 
practice, thus weakening the experiment from the start.         
Other approaches for studying religious phenomena with the tools of neuroscience include 
models which focus on specific parts and functionalisms of the brain. One area of focus is the 
temporal lobes, referred to by scholars as the “God module”, or “the seat” of spiritual 
experiences.
50
 The temporal lobes house the limbic system structures such as the amygdala 
and hippocampus that are the seat of emotional responses and also play a key role in memory. 
Additionally, the temporal lobe is involved in cognition and language – therefore, seeing as 
spiritual experiences more often than not are expressed very emotionally and elicit intense 
sensory experiences, plus being dependant (at least to a large extent) upon language, the 
temporal lobe could very likely be one of the connectors of the human brain with spiritual 
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 ”For this purpose, the parts of the body that are to be diagnosed are injected with a radioactive tracer. The 
tracer is a glucose analogue agent… A computer screen shows the metabolically active parts of the brain in 
colors.” (Runehov 2004, 71)  
47
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 (Newberg 2010, 169) 
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. Another area of focus, the twofold autonomic nervous system – the 
sympathetic, which mediates arousal and excitation, and the parasympathetic, which mediates 
calmness and quiescence
52
 – can contribute to different experiences. Blood pressure, body 
metabolism and heart rate are processes regulated by the autonomic nervous system. The two 
arms of this system – the sympathetic and the parasympathetic – could explain some of the 
paradoxicality of certain spiritual experiences, such as feeling overwhelming calmness 
simultaneously with significant alertness, shown by recent studies on the effects of two 
different types of meditation techniques on the nervous system.
53
     
3.3 The Participatory Turn 
In The Participatory Turn: spirituality, mysticism, religious studies (2008), Jorge Ferrer and 
Jacob Sherman present a coherent and detailed analysis of the contemporary climate and 
trends within the field of Religious Studies. They argue that the impact of the linguistic turn – 
although great and far-reaching – is not sufficient when it comes to explicating certain central 
questions within the field, especially pertaining to the study of mysticism and spiritual 
practice. By challenging various assumptions related to the linguistic turn and its limitations, 
they intend to prove the need for a move “beyond what Jürgen Habermas calls the 
`linguistification of the sacred.´”54 
The linguistic paradigm is characterized by an insistence that the study of religion should 
focus on communicative data like signs and meanings found in religious texts, practices, and 
worldviews. Ferrer elaborates: 
To “linguistify” the sacred means to subvert its transcendental authority in the Heavens and bring the 
legitimization of its cognitive and normative claims down to Earth, that is, to the intersubjective space 
constituted by communicative exchanges among rational human beings. In the disenchanted world of 
post/modernity, the sacred has been detranscendentalized, relativized, contextualized, and diversified 
but, most fundamentally, assimilated to linguistic expression.
55
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 Experiments done by Wilder Penfield, although controversial and inconclusive because it proved hard to 
replicate, nevertheless managed to elicit a number of strange experiences (strong visual and auditory 
experiences, dream-like states, complex hallucinations, etc.) by stimulating certain parts of the temporal lobe 
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Despite comprising an extremely diverse family of different approaches,
56
 the linguistic turn 
is deemed too narrow, because embracing its methodology means effectively abandoning all 
efforts to evaluate the epistemic status of “private consciousness or suprasensible experiences 
of the real, the sacred, the holy,” although it also involves, more positively, “approaching the 
study of religion as the examination of both public religious languages and the relationship to 
either the sensible world or to other elements of the linguistic framework.”57 Ferrer and 
Sherman examine seven areas within the field of Religious Studies wherein they believe 
evidence for the need to surpass the linguistic paradigm becomes clear. These seven areas are: 
(1) the postcolonial revaluation of emic epistemological frameworks; (2) the postmodern and 
feminist emphasis on embodiment and sacred immanence; (3) the resacralization of language; 
(4) the “pragmatic turn” in contemporary philosophy; (5) the renewed interest in the study of 
lived spirituality; (6) the question of religious truth in post-metaphysical thinking; and (7) the 
irreducibility of religious pluralism.
58
  
Regarding (1), it is argued that postmodern critiques of the Western scientific-philosophical 
metanarrative as “onto-theological”59 means that Western epistemologies – with their long-
assumed Enlightenment-biased belief in the epistemic superiority of critical rationality – 
deserve to be treated with critical suspicion. The epistemic hegemony of the Western 
Enlightenment project and its associated terms are thus put into question. Further, some 
scholars argue that insider (traditional) and outsider (scholarly) narratives of religion could be 
viewed as competing narratives, as neither side can claim a priori epistemological privilege.
60
 
Emic epistemologies can not only challenge our (inevitable) cultural biases, but can also raise 
new questions and stimulate fresh methodologies that should not be discounted from the get-
go. For example, in the study of mysticism, both King and Forman have argued that certain 
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 Ferrer and Sherman divide these into analytical (epistemology, philosophy of language, etc.), interpretive 
(hermeneutical approaches like phenomenology, comparativism, historicism, constructivism) and postmodern 
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 “The postmodern account of Western thinking as ontotheological is rooted in a writings of the two prophets 
of postmodernity: Friedrich Nietzsche and Heidegger. On the one hand, it stems from Nietzsche’s equation of 
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rationality (logos). Heidegger famously charged that such ontotheology is not only metaphysically destitute 
because it is incapable of really thinking being, but also religiously bankrupt because it gives us a God before 
whom one can “neither dance, nor sing, nor pray.” See (Ferrer and Sherman 2008, 56)    
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 (Flood 1999, pp. 139-142) 
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contemplative Asian epistemologies (Buddhist and Hindu in this case) challenge Katz’s 
abovementioned assertion that “accepting the culturally mediated nature of the contemplative 
path entails the impossibility of nonconceptual, unmediated mystical experiences.”61 
Recognizing the linguistically constituted nature of ordinary experience – and consequently, 
of knowledge – does not mean that one necessarily must behold to the idea that all knowledge 
is procured this way. Indeed, as we shall see in part II, several contemplative epistemologies 
emphasize the exact need for the dismantling of such constructive mechanisms, through the 
tool of contemplative practice. Thus, while contemplative practice might start out as a 
linguistic tool (as self-instruction can be seen as a form of private language game), several 
contemplative practices aim to decrease and totally silence all conceptual movements and 
forms of external stimuli by a process of intense interiorization and willed focus. The 
revaluation of emic epistemologies should not, therefore, be excluded. Challenging 
hegemonic claims of the linguistic paradigm, proponents of the participatory turn argue that 
deeper understanding of alternative epistemologies (which emphasize not only discursive 
reason, but also intuition, meditation, contemplation, etc.) may “be critical in the assessment 
of many religious knowledge claims.”62  
In terms of (2), there is a discernable re-focus on the centrality of the body and the sensuous 
in Religious Studies, demonstrated by Kripal’s quote: “If there is one universal in the history 
of religions, it is the human body and its physiological shaping of religious practice and 
experience.”63 In relation to (1) and (2) we also have (5), the renewed interest in the study of 
spirituality, where the two most distinct methodological features are self-implication and 
transformation.  Self-implication should be encouraged and recognized as a source of honest 
scholarship instead of methodological suspicion and weakness. Including scholars of 
spirituality especially, a number of Western scholars
64
 are “coming out” as spiritual 
practitioners. An example of this can be seen in the rise of Contemplative Studies in North-
America, which currently is in its formative stages. As shall be discussed in part III regarding 
meditation research, it is an open secret that nearly all academic researchers of meditation  
today also are practitioners, even though not everyone are equally clear about communicating 
this. One reason could be the supposedly contaminating effect strong personal involvement is 
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thought to be able to exert on academic objectivity. However, as Orsi has pointed out, 
Religious Studies academics are haunted by their own religious histories.
65
 He continues by 
pointing out “if sexual relations in the field is the great taboo subject of anthropology, our 
own religious histories is the great taboo of religious studies.”66 The duo of active 
engagement necessary to study the lived and highly personal aspects of religion like 
spirituality and mysticism, combined with the critical detachment from lived religion can 
together bring about not only informative, but transformative results – this transformative 
element, I will argue, is one the most important factors of contemplative practice, and cannot 
be as comprehensively addressed through the methods of the linguistic paradigm alone. 
One example illustrating the importance of transformation is whether some kind of personal 
engagement, like overcoming a mental addiction or developing contemplative competences 
(like stronger concentration or a more open, flexible mind), might be required for the 
assessment of certain religious truth claims.
67
 The issue of so-called ineffability comes to the 
fore here, as many contemplative practices emphasize the need to develop unique 
competences outside the structure of linguistic rationality (see part II). The participatory turn, 
then, sets out to solve the tension that exists “between the linguistification of the sacred and 
the emphasis on the nonlinguistic that characterizes important scholarship in religion.”68 
Proponents of participatory approaches argue for an enactive understanding of religious 
phenomena, insights, and experiences as co-created events. Ferrer and Sherman suggest that 
religious and spiritual phenomena are participatory insofar as they can appear as a result of 
every conceivable human attribute. Participatory modes of enactment are related to “bringing-
forth,” a central aspect of techne elaborated by Heidegger (which will be discussed in chapter 
4). Participatory knowing is creative, transformative, performative, as opposed to being 
objective and representational.   
For now, we need only concern ourselves with two crucial imperatives of the participatory 
turn. The first is a call to “move beyond objectivism and subjectivism toward the recognition 
of the interpretive and therefore largely constituted but nevertheless immediate nature of 
spiritual and religious knowledge.”69 The second imperative concerns the difference between 
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good and bad scholarship. Ferrer and Sherman propose that the divide between weak and 
strong scholarship should not be whether one follows Western or non-Western epistemologies 
– but rather be “between approaches that lead to radically empirical intersubjectively testable 
outcomes and/or discernible pragmatic consequences and those which do not.”70 
Two examples shall suffice as “proofs” as to the ongoing success and reality of the 
participatory turn – namely the abovementioned rise of Contemplative Studies in North-
America, and the so-called anthropotechnic turn espoused by Peter Sloterdijk in his major 
work You Must Change Your Life (2013). Starting with the latter, there is Sloterdijk who 
maintains that religion and religious expressions are nothing much other than misunderstood 
mental practice systems
71
. Further, he argues that the imperative of today – even more so than 
in the past – is the call to change one’s life and transcend, overcome, and transform oneself.  
Contemplative Studies is a developing interdisciplinary new-born academic field in North 
America which is dedicated to the critical study of contemplative states of experience. In 
various incarnations, it is taught at Ivy League universities like Brown and Stanford, and also 
at Rice, University of Virginia, and at New York University. At Brown, there has since 
October 2014 been a Contemplative Studies concentration, which require interested students 
to complete classes both within the humanities and the natural sciences. At Brown, 
Contemplative Studies is an attempt to:  
1) Identify the varieties of contemplative experiences of which human beings are capable; 
2) Find meaningful scientific explanations for them; 
3) Cultivate first-person knowledge of them;  
4) Critically assess their nature and significance.72    
In other words, it takes on and partially reflects some of the tension-areas mentioned above by 
the participatory turn proponents, and tries to solve these by applying new methodology – 
significantly, the combination of traditional third-person approaches mixed with more 
creative, innovate, critical first-person approaches. Again at Brown, contemplative 
experiences are studied from several perspectives: 
- Science: particularly psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and clinical medicine 
                                                 
70
 (Ferrer and Sherman 2008, p.10) 
71
 (Sloterdijk 2013, 1-15) 
72
 (Roth 2011, 32) 
21 
 
- Humanities: contemplative dimensions of literature, philosophy, and religion; 
- The creative arts: the role contemplation in both the creation and appreciation of the visual and fine arts, 
creative writing, and in the various performing arts of dance, drama, and music.
73
  
The critique of standard approaches to studying religion by proponents for Contemplative 
Studies also resemble the critique from Ferrer and Sherman.
74
 It should be noted that the 
participatory turn does not disavow the use of research methods which goes under the rubric 
of the linguistic paradigm. The point is rather that these methodologies alone seem 
insufficient to properly investigate, explicate and uncover the many conundrums related to 
contemplative practice. Therefore, I will use methods both from the linguistic and the 
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4 Religion as techne 
 
Techne (...) reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie 
before us (...)                                                                                
 – Martin Heidegger75 
No technique, no professional skill can be acquired without exercise; 
neither can one learn the art of living, the techne tou bon, without an 
askesis which must be taken as a training of oneself by oneself; this was 
one of the traditional principles to which the Pythagoreans, the Socratics, 
the Cynics had for a long time attributed great importance.                                                   
 – Michel Foucault76 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss and use the Greek term techne as a lens for understanding 
religion in general, and particularly practical religious expressions and phenomena, namely 
contemplative practices. Briefly, one limitation should be repeated: the ritualistic aspect of 
techne, which can be seen, e.g., in the magical-theurgical currents of Neoplatonism in 
especially late antiquity, or through the influence and spread of power-ritualistic Tantra a little 
bit later from India to Tibet and further
77
, will not be dealt with in this dissertation. For the 
sake of focus and space, I will exclusively focus on the contemplative aspects of techne.        
In the following, I will briefly outline some major tenets of the conceptual evolution the term 
has gone through, and its relation to two other central Greek words in philosophy, namely 
episteme and phronesis. Afterwards, I will present two theories that are instrumental in my 
conception of the technification thesis – von Hügel’s theory and philosophy of religion, and 
the subjectivization thesis of Helaas and Woodhead. Then, I will explicate the meaning of, 
and the links between, the following three key concepts: technification, transformation and 
practice. Through this, I will work out a definition of contemplative practice. Lastly, I will 
show how techne can be especially illustrative and enlightening as an analytical tool in the 
study of mysticism, in the form of what I call technical mysticism. By the end of the chapter, I 
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hope to have shown that techne is an inherent aspect of all contemplative practice in 
particular, and most religious practice in general.    
4.1 A Brief History of the Concept of Techne  
Techne is an ancient expression originating in Greek antiquity. In English, it is normally 
translated as either “art” or “craft.” The Greek technikon relates to that which belongs to 
techne. Thus, our contemporary words technique and technology are derived from techne. As 
both Heidegger and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy can tell us, there are especially 
two important factors to consider when it comes to the meaning of this word. First, the name 
does not only signify the skills and activities of the craftsman, “but also for the arts of the 
mind and the fine arts. Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis; it is something poietic.”78 
In his famous essay concerning technology, Heidegger stresses that the essence of technology 
lies in revealing, and not in its instrumentality, not in its function as a mere means to an end 
(this is not to say that Heidegger does not recognize instrumentality as an important aspect of 
technology). Second, it is important to note that since the earliest of days until at least Plato, 
techne has been linked to the word episteme. Episteme is usually translated as “knowledge,” 
and both words are names for knowing in the widest sense. “They mean to be entirely at home 
in something, to understand and be expert in it.”79 Therefore, the seemingly contemporary 
distinction between episteme as exclusively part of the theoretical domain, opposed to techne 
as exclusively part of the practical domain (think of the taken-for-granted dichotomy between 
pure theory and practice) – does not necessarily hold true at all when we take into account the 
usage of techne by the Greek philosophers of antiquity, especially the pre-Socratics.    
It is not until Aristotle that we first see an attempt at distinguishing techne and episteme 
systematically, even though Plato discusses techne in several of his dialogues.
80
 Still, even the 
great systematiser Aristotle uses these words interchangeably
81
, and sometimes refers to 
techne or “craft” as also episteme or “knowledge because it is a practice grounded in an 
account – something involving theoretical understanding.”82 Significantly, Aristotle makes an 
important distinction between techne and phronesis. Phronesis is often translated as practical 
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judgement or practical knowledge. Both techne and phronesis are for Aristotle considered as 
rational powers which give us “two quite distinct modes of practical knowledge.”83 Techne is 
associated with making, while phronesis is associated with acting. Aristotle argues that acting 
and making are not the same thing, because techne (i.e. the reasoned capacity to make) is 
aiming for something separate from the act of making, i.e., the product (the construction-
process of a table or house is not the same as the finished table or house, and both the act of 
making and its final product are something separate from the craftsman). There is, in other 
words, a distinction between the technite’s acting (production) and his intended goal (the 
product). In contrast, phronesis (i.e. the reasoned capacity to act) “characterizes a person who 
knows how to live well (..). It is acquired and deployed not in the making of any product 
separate from oneself but rather in one’s actions with one’s fellows.”84 
The Stoics, however, further develop the notion of techne and its relation to phronesis. 
Chrysippus said that practical judgment (phronesis) is a kind of techne concerning things 
having to do with life, and Zeno refers to a techne that can cure the diseases of the soul
85
. 
Zeno believed that virtue is practical knowledge (i.e. phronesis) in various forms
86
, and 
according to Sextus, phronesis provides a techne concerning life, seeing as phronesis is 
knowledge (episteme) of the good and the evil. Techne can thus understood be seen as the art 
or craft of life. The ultimate ideal of Stoic philosophy, the sage-philosopher, with perfect 
insight into the nature of good and evil, reality and the human condition, is evident in this line 
of thinking. The sage ideal is that of a master craftsman, who is flexible yet wise enough to 
adapt to every different situation in life with the appropriate response. Such a master 
craftsman is, according to Stoic thinking, capable of “crafting” or “shaping” his own interior 
life.
87
 The Stoics also borrowed from the great Aristotelian commentator Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, who coined the term stochastic techne. Stochastic are “the sorts of techne whose 
task is to try everything possible to achieve their goal, the realization of that goal being 
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subject to change.”88 This was a response to the problem that technai not always achieve their 
goals, so Alexander divided the technai “into ones which achieve their ends by definite steps 
and those which cannot.”89 In this way, the Stoic conception of techne pawed the way for “the 
powerful idea that the excellent human life, and happiness, is the same thing as performing in 
an artful way, striving for life of natural satisfactions, but actually finding ultimate value in 
the way one strives.”90 
There are two crucial components similar to all the different understandings of techne just 
described. The first is the central insight Heidegger espoused – namely the revelatory nature 
of techne. Techne is a creative endeavor, not just in terms of physical creation, but internally 
as well. It is about creating or revealing something that will not appear on its own, but 
requires on our part some mode of participation and enactment. Second, techne is about the 
artful and knowledge-based combination and harmonization of life’s contradistinctions and 
numerous occasions of unexpected challenge and pandemonium, as well as the more 
mundane trivialities of daily life. Said differently, techne can be seen as a craft or art of life, a 
form of knowledge and practical judgment that is not purely theoretical, but instead 
intrinsically participatory. It works as an intermediate between the practical and the 
theoretical; a hub which initiates a movement from the particular to the general, establishing a 
link between the concrete and the formless. To use a Hügelian term, it is the skill and the 
ability that helps us tackle “multiplicity within unity.” Both of the most central aspects of 
techne are thus participatory and enactive. To relate this to my technification thesis, I will 
now turn to von Hügel’s philosophy of religion. The participatory elements will be discussed 
in the following two sections in relation to the technification of religion. 
4.2 Friedrich von Hügel’s Philosophy of Religion – 
The Three Elements of Religion        
Baron Friedrich von Hügel (1852-1925) was, although largely forgotten today, one of the 
most learned men of his time. A lay intellectual of sorts, he was an influential Catholic thinker 
of his day and a Christian apologist, friend of Ernst Troeltsch, pen-pal and correspondent with 
William James on mysticism, and the spiritual mentor of Evelyn Underhill. Von Hügel 
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authored one of the greatest masterpieces of serious enquiry into mysticism, namely The 
Mystical Element of Religion as Studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and her Friends (1908), 
in which he developed a more wholesome and integrative view on mysticism than his friend 
James. In this his magnum opus, Hügel anticipated upcoming debates on mysticism (some of 
which are still ongoing)
 91
 and combined a variety of genres over the duration of the two 
volumes it comprises
92. This, in addition to the Baron’s Germanic style of writing, makes it a 
somewhat challenging, yet extremely rewarding read. According to Hügel, all religions carry 
three interrelated symbiotic elements that constantly battle each other for dominance and 
survival, each being necessary for the long-lasting fruition of a religion. For Hügel, religion is 
the tripartite interplay
93
 between “the historical-institutional element related to sense and 
memory (the Petrine dimension of Christianity), the analytical-speculative element related to 
reason (the Pauline dimension)”, and finally the most crucial component, “the intuitive-
emotional element related to will and action (the Johannine dimension)” 94. These three 
modalities or elements of religion are expressed as Institutionalism, Intellectualism, and 
Mysticism. These can of course be viewed as different sources of authority, and the reader 
might notice a resemblance to Weber’s three types of legitimate rule, namely traditional, 
legal-rational and charismatic.
95
 It is important to note, though, that Hügel’s work came out 
first in 1908, whereas Weber’s abovementioned essay was written sometime between 1917 
                                                 
91
 The two best examples are (i) his implicit critique of James’ exclusive emphasis on the private, personal and 
mystical side of religion at the expense of the institutional and social dimension (Hügel was one of the first to 
explicitly point this out to James in a letter from 1909), and (ii) Hügel’s recognition that “historically, logically 
and psychologically mysticism is always mediated and so to an extent is secondary to the historical, traditional 
and institutional elements.”(Kelly 1983, 206) This is expressed by Hügel throughout the book, but maybe most 
specifically here: “Never has religion been purely and entirely individual; always has it been, as truly and 
necessarily, social and institutional, traditional and historical.” (Hügel 1909 (Vol. I.), 59), and here:  “Now the 
tendency of a soul, when once awake to this necessary freshness and interiority of feeling with regard to God’s 
and her own actions, will again be towards an impoverishing oneness. It will now tend to shrink away from the 
External Institutional altogether. For though it cannot but have experienced the fact that it was by contact with 
this External that, like unto Antaeus at his contact with mother Earth, it gained its experience of the Internal, 
yet each such experience tends to obliterate the traces of its own occasion. (my emphasis)” (Hügel 1909 (Vol. I.), 
73-74). Thus I would argue that Hügel foreshadowed the debate started by Steven Katz in 1978 between 
contextualist understanding of mystical experiences versus essentialist interpretations of James and other 
scholars’ views (particularly Robert Forman’s) on mystical experience.    
92
 The book mixes elements from philosophy of religion, detailed historical biography, and theological-
philosophical accounts on mysticism, which makes it hard to categorize the work as belonging to only one 
discipline.    
93
 Von Hügel also identifies the three main “forces in Western civilization as Hellenism, Christianity, and 
science, powers whose proper harmonious interaction is necessary for the health of society.” (McGinn 1991, 
294) 
94
 Both quotes from (McGinn 1991, 294) 
95
 “Die Drei Reinen Typen der Legitimen Herrschaft”, translated by Sam Whimster as `The three pure types of 
legitimate rule.´ See (Weber 2004 (1922))  
27 
 
and 1920. So if there is a linkage, it is possible that von Hügel influenced Weber’s thinking, 
although I am not aware of any linkage nor correspondence between the two.  
As James Kelly has shown, Hügel conception of the three elements of religion was heavily 
influenced by William James’ early essay “Reflex Action and Theism.”96 Based on his 
reading of James, von Hügel developed an understanding that all human knowledge and 
activity start out with sense-impressions, followed by a central process of reflection, and 
ending in the discharge of will and action.
97
 Hügel established a tripartite (some would say 
Trinitarian) schema not just for religion, but also for the growth of the individual personality, 
and the maturation of civilization. These schemata are interrelated, and in the following I will 
focus on the relation between the three elements of religion and the three stages of the 
development of the personality, as expounded by Hügel.       
4.2.1 Institutionalism – The Authoritative-External-Historical-
Traditional Element 
As a child, one is born into a certain context. This context is simply given, i.e., it is normally 
taken for granted by the child that one’s circumstances are the ordinary way of things, the 
way things are. So in terms of all growth in knowledge and religion, the first stage of 
development for an individual, and for the religious personality, is characterized by a 
relatively passive acceptance of sense data and the social interpretation of reality they 
represent. The certainty and authority of tradition, which comes from outside the person, force 
their way through and demand obedience and respect. For the normal development of the 
individual, he needs to simply accept the experiences brought about from these externals, he 
needs to trust these social and institutional structures. It is impossible not to be influenced by 
this stage and the context one has been brought up in, as “the External, Authoritative, 
Historical, Traditional, Institutional side and function of Religion are everywhere evident.”98     
It is important to note that institutions, and the external, communal elements of religion in 
general, do not necessarily need to have ancient roots or follow centuries of unbroken 
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tradition. This element is comprised of both historic and old lineages, but also relatively new 
communal ecclesial elements of religious expressions. E.g., McGinn illustrates how Christian 
mysticism “especially in its formative phases, was always both ecclesial, that is, realized only 
in and through the community, and scriptural, that is, tied to the spiritual, hidden, or 
“mystical” meaning of the sacred texts.”99  
The positive sides of this element are that it provides safety, assurance and a foundation, upon 
which one can and must build one’s understanding of the social order. Most often, tradition 
and institutions are the gatekeepers to the already discovered wisdom of our forefathers, so it 
is also a necessary prerequisite for the next stage of development, which is the intellectual. On 
the negative side, however, there exists a real danger that an overemphasis on this institutional 
element can lead to disastrous effects, at the expense of the two others elements. From the 
history of Christendom, Hügel cites the Spanish Inquisition as the strongest warning of what 
can happen if there is “too great a preponderance of the “Objective,” of Law and thing, as 
against Conviction and Person; of Priest as against Prophet,”100 – in short, he warns against 
the dangers of worshiping the form rather than the meaning of religious expressions. From 
Judaic history, Hügel mentions the Pharisees and the Jerusalem Sanhedrin as the fullest 
representatives of institutional extremity. There exists, in other words, a very real potential for 
this necessary component of religion to degenerate into a kind of superstition – “an oppressive 
materialization and dangerous would-be absolute fixation of even quite secondary and 
temporary expressions and analyses of religion,”101 and therefore it is paramount for Hügel to 
emphasize that all the three elements of religion need to be harmonized and balanced.  
4.2.2 Intellectualism – The Analytic-Critical-Rational-Speculative 
Element 
The second element of religion is associated with the development of one’s individuality. In 
our youth, with the growing consciousness of one’s autonomy, one gradually starts 
questioning the traditional truths one has up until then taken for granted. This questioning 
often leads to a direct challenging of the established order, with the possible rejection of some 
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of one’s previously held beliefs. Personal experience and one’s own rationalization start to 
play an increasingly greater role in what one accepts or rejects, and for the religiously 
inclined, philosophy, theology and history can take on a new importance. The longing for 
creating a comprehensible understanding of everything, a system of the world, is a central 
driving force at this stage. This synthetic-philosophical element of religion is the soul-force 
by which we “analyze and synthesize, and the law of our being which requires us to weigh, 
compare, combine, transfer, or ignore the details and the evidential worth of what has been 
brought home to us through the stimulation of our senses.” Through the rational element of 
religion our social, historical, and institutional environment together with our intellect “orders 
us to harmonize all these findings into as much as may be of an intelligible whole of religion, 
and to integrate this religious whole within some kind of (…) general conception as to our 
entire life’s experience.”102     
This element of religion is obviously necessary and important for both the future 
systematization and institutionalization of any religion, but also – perhaps most importantly – 
for the feelings of autonomy and responsibility for the individual. Without an intellectual 
component (the absence of which, in reality, would be impossible) which is strong and 
comprehensive, the individual could never reach independence from the traditional and 
historical elements, which could easily lead to abuses and lack of any real sense of spiritual 
freedom. 
On the negative side, Hügel maintains that a destructive one-sidedness can develop from this 
element if left unchecked by the other two elements. This can lead to what he calls 
“Rationalistic Fanaticism,”103 that very easily leads to indifference and agnosticism. To 
counter such a development, one also needs to take into account the third element, namely the 
mystical-operative element. 
4.2.3 Mysticism – The Experimental-Emotional-Intuitive-Operative-
Element 
Hügel’s third element of religion is called the experimental and mystical, and represents the 
highest maturity in man’s spiritual evolution. At this stage “religion is rather felt than seen or 
reasoned about, is loved and lived rather than analyzed, is action and power, rather than either 
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external fact or intellectual verification.”104 Invoking his influence from James’ “Reflex 
Action and Theism,” Hügel concludes that man is foremost and necessarily a creature of 
action, more so than of sensation and of reflection. The ethical and volitional powers of the 
individual are accentuated, through not merely intellectualization and thinking, but by active 
engagement with external life and his personal inner struggles. Gradually, says Hügel, the 
man of action comes closer to his real self
105
, and gains more experience of his deeper 
personality.    
It is important to note that this mystical element of religion is not considered the ultimate, 
best, superior element of the three abovementioned elements. Despite the title of the book, 
and despite being classified as the most mature stage of the three modalities, von Hügel is 
very clear throughout the book that no one element is superior or exclusively better than the 
others. Rather, they are all interrelated and comprise a “multiplicity within unity”106 – 
creating an organic dynamic which in its countless manifestations and variations come to the 
fore as different religious expressions throughout history. As examples of this variety, Hügel 
mentions some of the great variety within several religions, focusing on Christianity
107
, 
wherein he believes the three modalities can be most clearly detected.  
In addition to this, each of the three elements also contains an inherent dualism, a doubleness 
that may seem contradictory. Between history and institutionalism, there is the collusion of 
past and present. Between criticism and construction, there is a dichotomy with analysis and 
acuteness of mind on the one hand, and synthesis and richness and balance of imagination on 
the other. And finally, between mysticism and the operative, there is the clash between 
otherworldliness and intuition (which can be considered passive), and the operative and 
volitional (considered active).
108
 According to Hügel, the three elements, and their single 
members of each pair, appear in every possible variety both in combination with, and in 
opposition to, all the others. However, “ultimately, not any one pair or member can bear its 
fullest fruit, without the aid of all the others,”109 yet they all try to dominate the soul of the 
individual at the expense of the others – which is why it is so easy to fall into the reductive 
traps of rigid fanaticism, arrogant materialism or indifferent agnosticism.       
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 The positive aspects of the mystical-experimental element of religion are that it accentuates 
the individual’s affective capabilities, promotes independence from the external, and stresses 
interiority and subjectivity. This can work as an antidote against an abstract, cold and purely 
rational religious constitution. The stress is on a “dim yet direct and (in its general effects) 
immensely potent, sense and feeling, an immediate experience of Objective Reality, of the 
Infinite and Abiding, of a Spirit not all unlike yet distinct from our own.”110 Hügel believes, 
in other words, that objective (divine) reality is accessible to the human personality – not 
through reason, but through intuitive felt mystical experience. When rational analytical 
discourse and the safety of tradition no longer satisfies the individual, he can turn inwards and 
discover a whole new universe and hitherto unforeseen dimensions of his religion or world 
view, and of himself. This experimental-intuitive move towards the interior is an important 
part of the process that leads, according to Hügel, to the development of a healthier, deeper 
and fuller personality.  
There is a danger, however, associated with the mystical-emotional element, just like the two 
other elements also have their pitfalls. Mystical experiences interpreted as having been a 
direct, immediate rendezvous with reality, can be so intense and leave behind a powerful 
impression of such awesomeness, that everything else pales into insignificance. Why bother 
with endless discussions and debates about the nature of reality, or the existence of god, if one 
has felt and experienced the answers to such questions? Why listen to traditionalists, why visit 
institutions covered with the dust of days gone by, when one has lived the very things they 
preach and seen what is represented in the artworks of the places of worship? Similar 
questions and conundrums can easily lead the individual with mystical propensities and 
experiences astray – turning him into an arrogant, self-important, introverted fanatic – 
walking into all “forms of illusions or degenerate into pure sentimentality or emotional 
fanaticism.”111 For these reasons, the mystical-experimental element also needs to be 
balanced by the other modalities, lest it overrides them by its sheer immensity and potential 
power. 
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4.3 Practice, Transformation and Technification 
Meditation, prayer, and different forms of yoga are different yet similar forms of 
contemplative-mystical practices. They usually have different objects of focus and somewhat 
different objectives, but the technicalities of the practices are often quite similar. Meditation 
can e.g. be defined as a self-administered attention-based technique for inner 
transformation.
112
 Does not the same apply for other forms of spiritual practice, like prayer? 
After all, all contemplative and non-contemplative practices require some mode of attention, 
and they usually are meant to produce some inner transformative effect – which can range 
from inner stillness, peace and reduced stress (e.g. mindfulness practices); destruction of 
harmful tendencies and psychological mechanisms like anger and hatred (e.g. christfulness); 
or appreciation and gratitude for life (e.g. centering prayer). The differences lie primarily in 
the rationale behind the practice and the metaphysical expectations attributed to it (e.g. 
Christian forms of practice like centering prayer is meant to open the individual up to the 
presence and grace of god, while secular mindfulness practice is primarily (for many people) 
a means of stress-reduction – the actual technicalities remain quite similar). But what exactly 
constitutes a spiritual practice or technique?  
Sloterdijk defines a practice as “any operation that provides or improves the actor’s 
qualification for the next performance of the same operation, whether it is declared or not.”113 
Further, Eifring argues that meditation is not just a form of practice but a technique, which is 
characterized by the five following components: 
(1) It is a deliberately undertaken practice aiming to produce certain effects.  
(2) Its procedures are specified with some degree of clarity. 
(3) It is clearly set aside from other activities in time.  
(4) It is sustained – repetitive or continuous – rather than sequential.  




Most forms of meditation concur with most of these five points according to Eifring – the 
most typical meditation techniques display all of the characteristics, while less typical ones 
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might miss one or several characteristics.
115
 I think Eifring’s five points work as a good point 
of departure for investigating and differentiating between different types of contemplative 
practices and techniques. E.g., the main cases examined in this dissertation – centering prayer, 
christfulness, and mindfulness – can be categorized as practices that are sustained, sequential, 
or both in the latter case, respectively. For the sake of clarity, I will use Sloterdijk’s general 
definition of practice together with Eifring’s abovementioned attention-based definition of 
meditation more generally as my definition of a contemplative technique or contemplative 
practice, and the words technique and practice will be used interchangeably. Also, in the 
course of the dissertation, when I write about contemplative praxis, I mean the combination of 
different contemplative techniques and practices that together comprise a specific 
contemplative praxis. Hence, I define a contemplative practice as any self-administered 
attention-based operation or procedure producing deep relaxation, and that provides or 
improves the actor’s qualification for the next performance of the same operation, ultimately 
aiming for inner transformation.   
The transformative component of contemplative techniques is paramount for understanding 
their significance and importance in religious traditions, and is the reason why “mystical” can 
be coupled to “contemplation.” Whatever mysticism really is, basically all researchers agree, 
as discussed in chapter 3, that mystical experiences are characterized by their transformative 
power. Still, even though over a century of research has been conducted about mysticism, 
little of it has focused on mystical-contemplative techniques. The emphasis of researchers has 
instead been on the mystical experience, and its interpretation, rather than on the means and 
procedures that supposedly produce such experiences. Luckily, this lack of serious research 
into the technical aspects of religion, mysticism and contemplation is beginning to change 
with the gradual but ongoing switch of paradigms from the linguistic turn into the 
intersubjective participatory anthropotechnic turn. 
Inner transformation can mean a lot of different things. Most relevant to this dissertation is a 
general twofold sense of inner transformation as a process through which (i) there is a clear 
distinction between the time prior to the inner transformation, and the time afterwards
116
; and 
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(ii) the transformation is, on some greater or minor level, noticeable for the individual who 
experiences it. A clear distinction between before/after and noticeability thus become the 
marks of inner transformation. It is a fair assumption that the transformative effects of 
contemplative-mystical techniques could explain why, historically and presently, ascetics, 
ecstatics and other types of spiritual specialists would voluntarily choose to practice these 
techniques despite the difficulties often associated with them
117
 (for more on the difficult 
aspects, see Part II and chapter 8). To be sure, the different techniques are often portrayed as 
enabling the individual to reach hitherto unknown inner states and experiences – such as 
states of bliss, boundless love, total freedom, deeper understanding of others and oneself, 
supernatural powers
118
, direct access to reality and the divine, etc. However, as you might 
have noticed already after reading my definition of inner transformation, it does not specify 
whether the transformation is generally good or bad. This is important to emphasize, as all 
three of the cases I will explicate and investigate in depth in Part II stress that practicing and 
working with contemplative techniques is not a linear one-directional rosy path towards 
guaranteed personal and spiritual improvement, but is rather a series of multi-directional 
spiraling movements – with fluctuating oscillations and variations in magnitude both upwards 
and downwards, between the pleasant and the unpleasant, the euphoric and the atrocious. If 
contemplative techniques indeed can work as mirrors for the deepest recesses of our psyches 
(as some of their proponents claim
119
), then such “bringing-forth” needs to be communicated 
candidly.   
There are numerous examples in the different contemplative traditions of what transformation 
actually entails. Some we have already mentioned, but it is worthwhile to mention the ones 
relevant to the case studies of part II. As will be shown in the chapters on centering prayer 
and christfulness, both these forms of praxis aim toward purifying the soul and developing 
openness to the divine. Mindfulness praxis, on the other hand, define inner transformation 
more in terms of a sense of wellbeing, of being able to better self-regulate and control oneself 
and one’s reactions to the stresses of daily living. As will be seen in part II, a higher tolerance 
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and readiness for change and the unexpected is another common element of inner 
transformation that is mentioned by practitioners of centering prayer, mindfulness and 
christfulness alike. Finally, the self-renunciation and self-imposed suffering of ascetics and 
some mystics (e.g. monks, nuns, basically all religious specialists who dedicate their lives to 
spiritual training) who not only practice contemplative techniques but also follow the 
corresponding communal (institutional) and ethical (intellectual) guidelines for self-
disciplining (like the noble eightfold path in Buddhism, or comprehensive monastic vows in 
Christianity, etc.), most assuredly has a role to play in creating or influencing an individual’s 
inner transformation. In other words, contemplative-mystical techniques themselves are not 
necessarily the only variable effecting inner transformation, although the main rationale 
behind the practices is the effecting of (or opening up for) such results. Von Hügel’s insight 
into the multiplicity of the religious personality, and the interrelated status of the three 
elements of religion, are illuminating and helpful in this regard, lest we fall into 
oversimplifications and untenable reductionisms. Such overemphasizing of one particular 
aspect of contemplative training – in this case the technical – can lead to what I choose to call 
the technification of religion.  
Technification of religion is a process wherein the mystical-experimental-intuitive element of 
religion predominates at the expense of the other two elements (Intellectualism and 
Institutionalism). Technification signifies therefore an overemphasis on the technical aspects 
of religious life, not always directly hostile towards the traditional or intellectual sides of 
religion, but necessarily threatening to these as the mystical disposition has a strong 
propensity for overshadowing the other two elements.
120
 In the following, I will argue how I 
see technification as a process that is illustrative and extremely important for understanding 
the situation of religion today (especially in the West), but also I will try to show how 
technification is an integral part of Hügel’s mystical-experimental element of religion, and 
how it has been very important throughout the history of religions. As evidence for the 
process of technification, both today and throughout history, I will specifically use Hügel’s 
philosophy of religion and the subjectivization thesis of Heelas and Woodhead from their 
famous work The Spiritual Revolution – why religion is giving way to spirituality (2005). I 
will start by explicating the subjectivization thesis. 
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The subjectivization thesis tries to account for one of the strangest contemporary 
predicaments of religion in Western societies, namely the concurrence of secularization and 
sacralization which is evident in the religious landscape. While there is a marked decline in 
church-attendance and other forms of traditional institutional worship and religious practice, 
there is also a noticeable growth and demand for alternative (often unchurched) forms of 
spirituality, many of which often sacralize subjectivity as their main source of significance. In 
short, the subjectivization thesis states that “`the massive subjective turn of modern culture´ 
favours and reinforces those (subjective-life) forms of spirituality which resource unique 
subjectivities and treat them as a primary source of significance, and undermines those (life-
as) forms of religion which do not,” and therefore, the thesis can work as an explanation of 
“the varied fortunes of different forms of religion and spirituality today by reference to a 
single process – the widespread cultural shift in emphasis from the value ascribed to life-as to 
the value ascribed to subjective-life.”121 This thesis is built on the Durkheimian principle that 
people “are more likely to be involved with forms of the sacred which are `consistent with 
their ongoing values and beliefs´ (...) - than with those who are not.”122 According to Heelas 
and Woodhead, the evidence for a subjective turn of Western contemporary culture is 
substantially documented.
123
 What is important to keep in mind is that through a strong focus 
on subjectivity – and consequently, the experiential self – the subjectivization thesis can 
clearly be linked to von Hügel’s third element of religion, the emotional-experimental-
mystical-intuitive element of religion. So in summary, the accentuation of subjectivity and the 
individual (in contrast to the traditional and communal) is one of the major conditions for 
technification.       
As discussed above, Hügel places the experimentally “lived and felt” aspects of religion 
together with the mystical and volitional element of religion. According to Hügel, if one 
successfully incorporates this third element harmoniously with the other elements, then the 
truth of religion becomes a life subjectively appropriated and lived. The personal and 
participatory aspects of Hügel’s third element of religion cannot, therefore, be ignored. The 
keywords here are participatory, operative and subjectivity. Hügel recognizes the 
participatory nature of religion by including experimental, volitional and operative together 
with the mystical element. Significantly, he not only attests to the quiet, passive and 
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introvertive sides of the mystical element, but also recognizes, and emphasizes, the active and 
powerful modalities associated with it.
124
 Therefore, Hügel’s conception of the mystical 
element of religion can be interpreted as a type of techne – a necessary tool to bring forth or 
reveal what cannot bring itself about; a form of knowledge which goes beyond the merely 
intellectual and theoretical by including the practical and the active through participation; an 
experimental approach to gain and deepen knowledge through experience by way of intuitive-
emotional development, in need of continuous operating and testing out of contemplative 
techniques. This type of inner experimentation is typical and crucial for the technification 
process. 
What then of concrete examples of technification? Contemporary examples from Buddhist, 
Christian and secular groups will be thoroughly investigated in part II of this dissertation. For 
now, I will only mention two examples. First we have a contemporary example – the modern 
revitalization of monasticism. According to McGinn “we are witnessing the emergence of a 
true world monasticism.”125 In some respects, the revival of monasticism in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries is as remarkable as the story of its origin in the fourth. Today, we 
witness the noteworthy spread of (particularly Benedictine) monasticism, its variety of reform 
and renewal movements, and its growth not only in Western Europe (its traditional abode), 
but also the spread of new reforms into North America (since the mid-nineteenth century) and 
later into developing countries, “predominantly in Latin America, Africa, and Asia”126 (since 
the mid-twentieth century). Although this modern trend certainly can be seen as a 
strengthening of the institutional element of religion, it can also be seen as strengthening the 
mystical element of religion
127
, and hence, as an example of technification. Second, as to 
older forms of technification, the shramana-traditions of ancient India serve as an illustrative 
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linkage between mysticism and monastic asceticism in (Wimbush and Valantasis 1995, pp. 58-74)   
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example. From around 800 to 400 BC, Prakrit and Sanskrit texts illustrate the emergence of a 
new ideology of renunciation, in which “knowledge (jnana) is given precedence over action 
(karma), and detachment from the material and social world is cultivated through ascetic 
practices (tapas), celibacy, poverty, and methods of mental training (yoga).”128 This period 
was characterized by increased urbanization, and consequently, more room for individualism 
and personal autonomy.
129
 The time also saw a devastating spread of disease among the new 
urban population, which is hypothesized as a major contributing factor for the rise of ascetic 
movements and their increased emphasis, both philosophically and practically, on the 
problem of suffering. Thus, both the good and bad consequences of urbanization led to a 
loosening up of social norms and traditional authority, best evidenced by the rejection of 
many shramana-traditions of the authority of the Vedas (e.g. Buddha’s rejection of the caste-
system). In this way, “personal experience (..) is placed above the received knowledge of the 
vedic revelation.”130 It is in the context of the shramana-traditions that the formation of the 
Upanishads and the rise of Buddhism and Jainism occur. As such, we can primarily see in this 
period serious challenges posed against both institutionalism and tradition – through the 
thorough-going rejection or reinterpretation of orthodox brahmanical teachings
131
. A 
flowering of new intellectual developments and practical participatory approaches for gaining 
knowledge and liberation from suffering emerge from the shramana-traditions, and there is 
fair interplay between intellectualism and mysticism in the different schools. My argument is 
that the strong emphasis – both within Buddhism and Jainism, and in other shramana-schools 
like the Ajivikas
132
 – on contemplative techniques reveal that the experimental-mystical-
operative element in many cases predominated at the expense of the analytical-speculative 
element, even though the intellectual element certainly also finds expressions in the 
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 It is important to note, however, that while Brahmanism rejected the authority and teachings of shramana-
orders, teachings similar to those of shramana – concerning rebirth, retributive action, and liberation – were to 
find expressions in the Upanishads, the fourth and final layer of the Veda – the Vedanta (end of Veda). (Flood 
1996, 82) 
132
 We only know of the Ajivikas from Buddhist and Jaina sources (who are hostile and hence not neutral), as 
their own texts did not survive and the tradition seemed to disappear by the end of the 13
th
-century. Possibly 
“the term Ajivikas may have been used as a general term, especially for naked ascetics.” (Samuel 2008, 120) 
Even though nothing specific has come down to us regarding their spiritual techniques, Eliade argues that “we 
must suppose that the sect had its own ascetic tradition and its own secrets for meditation, and that it was this 
esoteric tradition that accounted for its survival,” as it exerted its presence in India for two millennia. (Eliade 





. After all, the analytical-speculative development tends to be 
slower and more gradual than the experimental-intuitive-mystical element, the latter of which 
sometimes manifests itself through the spiritual breakthroughs or particular philosophico-
psychological insights of specific individuals, who then tend to become authority figures, like 
religious leaders or founders
134
. In terms of speed, lasting effect and development, I think it is 
fair to say that of the three elements, the mystical tends to be the most rapid both in terms of 
its occurrence and its disappearance, followed by a more thorough intellectual analysis of the 
foundational experimental-mystical elements, whose elaborate doctrines in turn, lastly, 
fossilizes into an institutional framework. The last stage of institutionalization thus tends to 
happen a long time after the mystical breakthrough. Importantly, my argument stipulates that 
technification is a central part of the history of religions, as a process of reaction against most 
often institutionalism and to some extent intellectualism – always leading to a renewal of 
religious expressions and forms, often in the shape of what eventually becomes a new 




Technification is therefore, based on the abovementioned, defined as: a process in which the 
experimental-mystical element of religion (which is always participatory) predominates at the 
expense of the intellectual and institutional elements, often as a reaction against the 
predominance of the latter two – which leads to a rejection or reinterpretation of traditional 
teachings, and often the production of new teachings appropriated to the prevailing 
philosophical climate
136
 of the participant. Technification, then, is a central and natural 
process of religious/contemplative development, evidenced both in ancient times and today’s 
contemporary spiritual landscape. It is an appropriate term as it reminds us of techne and 
therefore denotes that the process is participatory, revelatory (poietic), and emphasizes using a 
                                                 
133
 A possible critique of my statement here – and indeed of von Hügel’s trichotomy – is that it is very hard, 
maybe impossible, to know whether our earliest sources reflect mainly intellectual or mystical elements of the 
particular tradition described. The safest answer is to maintain that they represent both. Still, in the case of the 
historical core of Buddhist teachings, I agree with Samuel’s argument that they were more likely to have “been 
a set of practical and experiential techniques rather than a body of discursive knowledge.” (Samuel 2008, 139) 
134
 E.g. the Buddha Sakyamuni for the Buddhists, Mahavira (also known as Vardhamana) for the Jainas, and 
Makkhali Gosala for the Ajivikas. (Samuel 2008, 120) 
135
 E.g. the possibility that at least parts of vedic religious practices gave rise to and morphed, through the 
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tool (e.g. contemplative technique) or mastering a craft through training (asceticism) and 
experimenting with inner transformation (technical mysticism), to gain knowledge and new 
experiences that the individual believes to be missing in the two other elements of religion.  
     
4.4 Asceticism as Technical Mysticism 
As explained above, techne is related to the knowing-how, to working or crafting out 
something through participatory and experimental means. Asceticism, as discussed in chapter 
3, can in all its variants be viewed as forms of training and self-forming, shaping oneself 
through the fires of pain, repetition and exercise. The types of training that applies to 
contemplative practices, that are identified by their transformative element and focus on self-
administered attention-regulation, can be considered mystical insofar as they induce or “bring 
forth” entirely new experiences of a hitherto incomparable nature. In short, contemplative 
techniques seem to be able to induce transformative experiences. As instruction manuals or 
maps for the soul, contemplative practices elaborate and point towards the ineffable by saying 
“if you do A, B will happen”. Why not treat these claims as scientific hypotheses and test 
them
137
 through the rigors of proper scientific scrutiny? This obviously does not apply to all 
contemplative practices, but the three practices investigated in this study can be classified 
under this rubric.  
Therefore, I propose a (somewhat) radical empiricist notion: if mysticism research is to 
advance beyond the seemingly neutral third-person textual study of mystical texts – as nearly 
all academic study of mysticism has been a study of language
138
 –, we need to start proper 
experimentation with mystical techniques and contemplative practices (which can be the 
same). Experiments (both personal and scientific) with practices of inner transformation are 
what I define as technical mysticism. Asceticism, understood as self-forming (Foucault), or as 
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“asymmetrical self-doubling” and a “supercompensation augmented by a form of 
superadaptation” through repeated self-discipline and self-denial (Sloterdijk)139, is essentially 
then the same as technical mysticism.     
With the exception of TM (Transcendental Meditation) and mindfulness research, scientific 
studies of contemplative practices have been conducted only sporadically in the past
140
. Some 
of the main issues with TM and mindfulness research however, and indeed any scientific 
research of contemplative practice, include the problems related to non-randomized control 
group variables (i.e. weak research designs)
141
 and the difficulty of applying one standard 
definition of the object of study (i.e. one standard definition of meditation)
142
. Additionally, 
the supposed scientific proofs of the positive effects of practicing these types of 
contemplative practices have been substantially overhyped
143
 in the media. Luckily, 
meditation researchers are increasingly trying to counter this by more balanced studies, 
evidenced best, I would argue, in the growing field of Contemplative Studies
144
 in North-
America.    
Embracing the intersubjective participatory anthropotechnic turn, I also suggest, based on my 
own experience with contemplative practice, that agnostic or other researchers unfamiliar but 
interested in these subjects, should look into the emic (observant-near) perspectives of 
practitioners by practicing themselves – i.e. performing technical mysticism. In my own case, 
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such practicing led to new insights into possible reasons
145
 for the popularity (both 
historically and contemporary) of contemplative practices. This might sound controversial, 
but as long as there is no risk of danger for oneself or others, I do not see why this should be 
such a taboo for the researcher. One natural objection would be that this is a case of doing 
religion as opposed to studying it academically, but in line with the participatory turn I would 
argue that such “doing” need not be detrimental for academic validity or reliability. Rather, it 
could enhance our understanding of a topic ignored far too long by researchers: namely the 
mysteries of our own potential for self-forming and inner transformation, our very capacity 
for technical mysticism.      
4.5 Conclusion: Religions’ Inherent Technical 
Aspects  
In this chapter, I have investigated the various meanings of the term techne, and its relation to 
episteme and phronesis. As has been shown, techne refers to both craft and a form of art, but 
the nature of such art form can vary greatly – from the mundane and specific know-how of 
building tables – the craftsmanship of table-building –, to the complex understanding of the 
governing principles of the universe, human nature, and self-control – the art of life. Techne is 
related to theory and knowledge insofar as it consists of knowing how-to, can give an account 
of its workings, and can be taught to others. It is at the same time practical, pertained to 
worldly participation, experimentation, action and doing, not just passive reflecting.   
I have also looked into the difference and connections between contemplative practice, inner 
transformation, and technification. I argue that technification is an inherent aspect of religion, 
as a process of reaction against the overemphasis or predominance of non-technical aspects of 
religion. I have also argued for the need for experimentation with contemplative practice – 
what I call technical mysticism. Such a category could in my opinion be useful in the study of 
mysticism. An adequate understanding of religion cannot be complete without a thorough 
investigation into the technical aspects of religion. As religion is something participatory, 
something that engages the human mind, motivates so much action, and promises such grand 
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rewards for following and mastering their decrees and attaining their secrets – it is impossible 
to understand and explain religious behavior and development, in all its variations, without 
accounting for the technical aspects of religion. Therefore, we will now turn to part II of the 





























5 Case Study A: From Buddhist 
Vipassana to Secular Mindfulness 
 
[Mindfulness is] the unfailing master key for knowing the mind, and is thus the starting point; 
the perfect tool for shaping the mind, and is thus the focal point;           
the lofty manifestation of the achieved freedom of the mind, and is thus the culminating point. 
Therefore the `Foundations of Mindfulness´ (Satipatthana) have rightly been declared by the 
Buddha as the ´Only Way` (ekayano maggo).      
- Nyanaponika Thera (1962)
146
 
Mindfulness is the awareness that arises from paying attention, on purpose, in the present 
moment, and non-judgmentally (…).       
Mindfulness can only be understood from the inside out. (…)    
          
 The intention and approach behind MBSR were never meant to exploit, fragment, or 
decontextualize the dharma, but rather to recontextualize it within the frameworks of science, 
medicine (including psychiatry and psychology), and healthcare (…). 
- John Kabat-Zinn (2013)147  
 
In this chapter, I will trace and offer an explanation of the historic development and rise of 
what can be called the Mindfulness Movement. This movement fosters and operates on the 
assumption that a specific series of so-called secular meditation techniques of mental self-
administration can solve many of life’s most common problems, and work as self-therapy. 
Over the course of the last decade, there was a dramatic increase in its popularity and 
propagation. Football coaches, Pentagon officials, corporate CEOs as well as professional 
clinicians, teachers and politicians have attested to its efficacy. Seemingly, these techniques 
work wonders. Its impact can be felt far beyond the pillars of academia and the public 
meditation centers. But what exactly is mindfulness? Both as a term and as technique, 
wherefrom does it originate? Why such popularity?  
To answer these questions it is necessary to look closer at the origins of the term, its Buddhist 
roots, and its practical application today. There are numerous studies that have been 
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conducted to this effect. These and the works of John Kabat-Zinn, the main popularizer of the 
term, will be the primary sources for my explication of the Mindfulness Movement. Of the 
several works by Jon Kabat-Zinn on mindfulness, I will use his main work which propelled 
him onto the US and then international stage as a guru of stress management systems. The 
book Full Catastrophe Living – How to cope with stress, pain and illness using mindfulness 
meditation (1990) has been called “the bible for a mind/body movement that has transformed 
Western medicine.”148 It is based on Kabat-Zinn’s popular 8-week stress reduction 
programme at the University of Massachusetts Medical Centre, where mindfulness is taught 
to help people cope with illnesses, stress, anxiety and pain. In the following, I will argue that 
within the realm of contemporary Buddhism, mindfulness represents one of the best examples 
of technification of religion. I shall argue that mindfulness, as presented by its main 
proponents, is highly technical not just in terms of practicability, but also as a way or craft of 
life meant to effect or open the doors of self-transformation. Finally, I shall examine what 
may be the underlying causes behind its increasingly noticeable popularity.  
5.1 From Sati to Vipassana to MBSR (Mindfulness-
based stress reduction) 
The founder of the Pali Text Society, T.W. Rhys Davids, was probably the one who first 
translated the Buddhist technical term sati (in its Pali form) or smrti (in its Sanskrit form) by 
the word `mindfulness´, in 1881
149
. Following Rhys Davids example, especially his 
translation of the Mahasattipatthana Sutta, `mindfulness´ was established as the standard 
English translation for sati in subsequent Buddhist scholarship (e.g. in Chalmer’s partial 
translation of the Majjhima Nikaya (1926), Nyanaponika’s far-reaching and important work 
The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (first published in 1954), and Bhikku Nanamoli’s 
influential translation of Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga (first published in 1956), to name but 
a few)
150
.     
The basic meaning of the sati/smrti (henceforth only sati will be used) is “memory” or 
“recollection”. According to Jens Braarvik, in the traditional Indian context wherein the term 
originated, sati denoted what every Indian of the upper class had to remember, namely sruti, 
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which means the tradition of interpretation of “that which has been heard from the gods.”151 
In its Buddhist usage however, `mindfulness´ works better as an illustrative translation, 
because it not only denotes active remembrance, but is also connected to the present moment. 
In fact, sati could (in Buddhist usage) be understood as the “remembering of the present”, 
which in Buddhist psychology is a projection of the past. Therefore, Nyanaponika and others 
argue that `mindfulness´ makes more sense than `memory´ as the correct English translation, 
as it shows “the close and constant connection between the functions of memory and attention 
(or mindfulness), and will thereby explain why in Pali, the language of the Buddhist 
scriptures, both these mental functions are expressed by the one word sati.”152 The scriptural 
basis for sati is found in the famous Satipatthana Sutta, which is translated by Nyanaponika 
as `Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness´. This discourse appears on two occasions in 
the Pali Canon – “(1) as the 10th Discourse of the `Middle Collection of Discourses´: 
(Majjhima Nikaya), (2) as the 22
nd
 Discourse of the `Long Collection´ (Digha Nikaya) where 
it has the title Maha-satipatthana Sutta, i.e. the Great Discourse, etc.”153 These texts indicate 
the importance of sati as being “sufficient as the ekayano maggah – the one vehicle or way to 
enlightenment.”154 What one can use as objects for mindfulness, what to be aware of, is listed 
in the Satipatthana Sutta
155
, classified under categories such as body, feelings, mind and 
states of consciousness. Under feelings-mindfulness one e.g. finds an emphasis on the coming 
and going of emotions; under body-mindfulness one can find the famous “walking 
meditation,” both of which are taught in Kabat-Zinn’s adoption of  these classical and 
canonical practice descriptions into his own system of contemplative training. 
Two other terms popular in contemporary meditation lingo are samatha and vipassana (Pali). 
These technical terms can be translated as ”inner peace, quiescence, peacefulness or 
peaceful/calm meditation,” and “seeing all around, expanded vision, or insight meditation,”156 
respectively.  These two words seem to denote qualities of meditation as opposed to specific 
forms of meditation, and are poorly defined in the Buddhist literature. Within Buddhist 
Studies and especially among Buddhist practitioners, there is contention about whether the 
meditative emphasis should be on samatha, vipassana, or a combination of the two
157
. 
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Traditionally, both approaches have been understood to be vital for meditative achievements, 
but modern readings tend to separate them
158
. An example of the former is Martine 
Batchelor’s understanding of samatha and vipassana as the two main ingredients of Buddhist 
meditation, translated by her as “concentration” and “experiential inquiry,” respectively159. 
According to Robert Sharf, the modern practice of vipassana can be traced to 
early twentieth-century teachers such as Phra Acharn Mun (1870-1949) in Thailand, Dharmapala (1864-
1933) in Sri Lanka, and U Narada (1868-1955) and Ledi Sayadaw (1846-1923) in Burma. Prior to this 
time, bhavana (meditation, or mental development) consisted largely of the recitation of Pali texts 
pertaining to meditation (such as the Satipatthana-sutta and the Metta-sutta), chanting verses 
enumerating the qualities of the Buddha, reciting formulaic lists of the thirty-two parts of the body, and 
so on. (…) Even today, after the full effect of the vipassana  movement has been felt, historical and 
ethnographic studies still testify to the fact that meditation plays a minor if not negligible role in the 
lives of the majority of Theravada monks.
160
        
Controversially, Sharf claims that the specific techniques and lineages of vipassana practice 
cannot be traced further back than the 19
th
-century. He stresses that recreation of Theravada 
Buddhism and the influence of the Occident of this period, especially in Burma and Sri 
Lanka, can be seen “in the context of the major ideological changes precipitated by the forces 
of urbanization, modernization, and the spread of Western style education, all of which 
contributed to the rise of Protestant Buddhism.”161 Further, he argues that the elites of Burma 
and Sri Lanka responded to their colonial situation by embracing their national and spiritual 
heritage through Theravada Buddhism, only “refashioned in the image of post-Enlightenment 
Christianity.”162 This reform of Theravada can be summarized by four characteristics: (i) the 
values of individualism
163
, (ii) a rational or “instrumental” approach to Buddhist teachings, 
often involving “the repudiation of the `supernatural´ or `magical´ aspects of Buddhism, the 
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rejection of `empty´ ritual, and the insistence that Buddhism is a `philosophy´ rather than a 
`religion,´”164 (iii) a new universalism, and rejection of the authority of the clergy, and (iv) a 
renewed interest in the scriptural legacy of Theravada Buddhism, the impetus for which 
mainly came from British Orientalists like T.W. Rhys Davids. The Theosophists also played a 
crucial part in the Theravada revival.
165
  
Today, most of the popular vipassana techniques taught internationally can be traced back to 
two vipassana lineages from Burma, namely those based on the methods of Ledi Sayadaw 
and U Narada
166
. Arguably, the method of vipassana that has been most influential is called 
“The New Burmese method.” Believed to be initiated by U Narada’s understanding of the 
Satipatthana-sutta, a famous disciple of his, Mahasi Sayadaw (1904-1982), became the main 
disseminator of this practice. Many of Mahasi’s disciples spread the technique throughout 
South and Southeast Asia, Europe and America
167
. When “Westerners speak of vipassana 
today they are often referring to the specific style popularized by Mahasi.”168 A major reason 
for this tradition’s important influence is that it was the first to establish a vipassana practice 




. Additionally, Sharf 
highlights two central features of Mahasi’s teachings contributing to their popularity: (1) the 
ability to enter into “the path of vipassana (insight into the Buddhist truths) without the need 
for prior training in concentration exercises (samatha) or mastery of advanced states of 
meditative trance (jhana),”170 and (2) the promise of quick results – e.g. within a month or 
even within 7 days for the most apt, practitioners would be able to experience “nibbana-
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tasting.” Consequently, Mahasi differed significantly with the traditionalist view on the 
availability and time requirements needed for results from meditative practice.
171
 The result of 
these main features – i.e. accessible easy-to-learn meditation techniques and their propagation 
through the establishing of urban meditation centers open for the laity
172
 – led to a 
democratization of meditation practice. This started in Burma, then spread to other Asian 
countries and eventually also to the West, where it would influence, among others, Jon Kabat-
Zinn.     
Jon Kabat-Zinn is architect behind the mindfulness-based stress reduction programme 
(henceforth MBSR). His definition of mindfulness mentioned at the start of the chapter has 
become the prima facie standard expression in the West for what mindfulness is. Kabat-Zinn 
acknowledges several important influences in his development of MBSR, including 
Theravada (i.e. the modern vipassana reform movements discussed above) and Mahayana 
(Soto and Rinzai Zen traditions) roots, and some currents from yogic traditions and the 
teachings of Krishnamurti.
173
 Kabat-Zinn started his daily meditation practice in 1966, and 
describes how he had a peculiar vision during a two-week IMS vipassana retreat in 1979.  
The vision had mystical qualities (even though Kabat-Zinn himself does not call it 
“mystical”), including James’ two predominant qualities (noetic quality and ineffability). 
Most importantly, however, it was transformative: 
(..) I had a `vision´ that lasted maybe 10 seconds. I don’t really know what to call it, so I call it a vision. 
It was rich in detail and more like an instantaneous seeing of vivid, almost inevitable connections and 
their implications. (…) I saw in a flash not only a model that could be put in place, but also the long-
term implications of what might happen if the basic idea was sound and could be implemented in one 
test environment – namely that it would spark new fields of scientific and clinical investigation, and 
would spread to hospitals and medical centers and clinics across the country and around the world, and 
provide right livelihood for thousands of practitioners. Because it was so weird, I hardly ever mentioned 
this experience to others. But after that retreat, I did have a better sense of what my karmic assignments 
might be. It was so compelling that I decided to take it on wholeheartedly as best I could.
174
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This experience led him to initiate what was later
175
 to become MBSR in 1979 at Harvard 
University Medical School. He notes how “pretty much everything I saw in that 10 seconds 
has come to pass (...).”176 
5.2 The Secularization of Modern (Theravada) 
Buddhism 
Kabat-Zinn’s vision gave him the impetus to create a system of stress-relief based on his 
experience with Buddhist practice adapted to an American audience. To do this, he had to 
simplify and americanize the terms used, and contextualize the dharma within respectable 
fields of inquiry, which in this case would be medicine and psychology. Being a professor of 
medicine and a charismatic leader-type, he proved to be the right man for the job. Kabat-Zinn 
explicates his thinking on developing an American vocabulary to accomplish this endeavor: 
I thought of it in those terms at the time. Now I am not quite sure what adjective to use. Secular might 
do, except that it feels dualistic, in the sense of separating itself from the sacred; I see the work of MBSR 
as sacred as well as secular, in the sense of both the Hippocratic Oath and the Bodhisattva Vow being 
sacred, and the doctor/patient relationship and the teacher/student relationship as well. Perhaps we need 
new ways of `languaging´ our vision, our aspirations, and our common work. Certainly it is only a 
matter of `American´ in the US. Each country and culture will have its own challenges in shaping the 
language to its own heart-essence without denaturing the wholeness of the dharma
177
 (my emphasis).   
It is worth noting that Kabat-Zinn uses the terms secular and sacred when he describes the 
work and meaning of MBSR. The verbalized forms of these seemingly mutually exclusive 
concepts and the processes they represent – whether understood as growth or decline of 
traditional institutional authority, or as strengthening personal disinterest or interest of the 
importance of a spiritual/religious element in one’s life – have been shown to concur in 
Western societies, especially by Heelas and Woodhead.
178
 They, however, studied such a 
concurrence by comparing and dichotomizing two categories, namely religion and spirituality, 
arguing that the former is characterized by life-as forms “(life lived as a dutiful wife, father, 
husband, strong leader, self-made man etc.),” while the latter is related to subjective-life, 
which entails “life lived in deep connection with the unique experiences of my self-in-
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relation.”179 The short and simplified version of Heelas and Woodhead’s argument is that 
religion (and life-as variants in general) is losing ground in the West, a process fitting all of 
Dobbelaere’s three senses of secularization previously referred to in chapter 2; whereas 
spirituality (and non-spiritual subjective-life versions) is gaining ground. This is especially 
true where its proponents are actively adapting to the needs of the public, providing e.g. 
alternatives to deal with pain and stress through MBSR (which can thus be viewed in the third 
sense of Dobbelaere’s exposition of secularization – i.e. as change in the religious economy 
adapting to the new requirements of the times).          
We have already seen how the fusion of some Western norms and expectations ( through 
colonialism, with traditional Buddhist norms and practices contributed to what Sharf and 
others have called Reform Buddhism, which has an explicit focus on individuality, as well as 
a clear instrumental approach to Buddhist teachings. This instrumentality can be seen in 
Kabat-Zinn’s operational definition of mindfulness180. On the one hand, instrumentality is 
reminiscent of what Weber criticized about the calculatedness and extreme bureaucratization 
of modernity – the notion that everything can be mastered through calculation, planning and 
intellectualization. This “disenchanted” Weberian notion of modern Western life can in the 
case of MBSR relate to the idea of how an 8-week course, or the mastery of technicalities of a 
certain practice, is seen as sufficient to reduce pain and stress, and thereby “cure” the 
maladies of psycho-somatic discomfort (e.g. stress or existential crisis) through a thoroughly 
calculated intellectual process. This is an example of disenchantment insofar as it strips the 
healing process of any magical or spiritual element by reducing the process to a mechanistic 
neuro-causal chain of events
181
 that can be perfectly controlled and calculated. On the other 
hand, though, Kabat-Zinn repeatedly stresses the non-instrumental dimension of 
mindfulness
182
, and how his “personal affinity with the various streams of Chan and Zen”183 
lead to an emphasis from the early start of MBSR on non-doing and non-instrumentality, and 
hence on non-striving, not-knowing, and significantly, “non-attachments to outcomes, even to 
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positive health outcomes.”184 According to Kabat-Zinn, healing is understood not as a cure, 
but rather as “a transformation of view, (…) recognizing your intrinsic wholeness and, 
simultaneously, your connectedness to everything else. Above all it involves coming to feel at 
peace within yourself.”185 He further elucidates how it is a uniquely personal endeavor to 
achieve such healing
186
. In this sense, MBSR can be seen as a substantial expression of the 
subjective anthropotechnic turn, accentuating the relation towards oneself as opposed to outer 
forms of authority, and, to quote Sloterdijk, validating one’s “immunological status in the face 
of vague risks of living and acute certainties of death.”187 
From a Buddhist perspective, MBSR can be seen as a secularized
188
 form of Buddhism made 
accessible to the West through the skillful means (upaya) of Kabat-Zinn and his earliest 
colleagues at the Stress Reduction clinic. However, some have feared that Kabat-Zinn’s 
recontextualization of Buddhist teachings might close the door to the traditional dharma, by 
de-familiarizing practitioners with the vast richness of original concepts and teachings found 
in the Pali-canon, “the metaphors of the Mahayana sutras and the paradoxes of the Zen 
koans.” 189 Kabat-Zinn himself notes that it is more important for MBSR teachers to embody 
the essence of the dharma and guide students to experiment with the practices so that they can 
taste and see for themselves the reality of the Buddhist doctrines, like the Four Noble Truths 
(Kabat-Zinn proposes to call these `the four realities´)
190
, the Eightfold Noble Path, the 
doctrine of non-self, etc. His point is that the essence, rather than cultural baggage and foreign 
words
191
, is the crux of meditative practice and efficiency. As we saw above, Kabat-Zinn 
used, although reluctantly, `secular´ as a description of MBSR vocabulary, but it is important 
to note that he himself does not separate MBSR’s Buddhist’s roots from the practice.192 
However, the de-emphasis on explicit Buddhist discourse in the MBSR programs (like the 
insistent use of `stress´ instead of `dukkha´) seems to have led to the assumption that 
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mindfulness is something completely secular (as in non-religious) and completely unrelated to 
Buddhism. Given the facts just mentioned, and the fact that to be a certified MBSR instructor 
you need to complete and attend a long-stay instructor-led meditation retreat
193
 (the great 
majority of which tend to be predominately Buddhist), it is hard to separate MBSR 
completely from its Buddhist roots.     
Still, it can be argued that MBSR not only represents a secularization of Modern Buddhism 
(which it undoubtedly does to some extent), but also it can be understood as a form of re-
enchantment (Wiederzauberung). By re-enchantment I mean the reversal of Weber’s 
disenchantment, the return of the magical or mystical, of those most sublime values 
observable in public life that he thought went away in the maelstrom of modernity. 
5.3 The techne of Mindfulness 
Mindfulness, as understood and taught by Kabat-Zinn, is essentially a purposeful, non-
judgmental state of being in the present moment. This present-mindedness is incredibly near 
and immediately accessible; while at the same time it is not a common state of being for most 
people. Many will find it difficult to maintain such an aware and open outlook throughout the 
moments of daily life. If one can learn to do this however, Kabat-Zinn suggests that it can 
alter the way one perceives and deals with the world, oneself, and one’s worries in life. 
Significantly, being in the moment can supposedly help with a wide range of issues (greater 
acceptance and hence reduction of pain, self-awareness leading to self-acceptance, improved 
relationships, etc.), and is indeed the only thing we can truly control. Through his highly 
acclaimed MBSR programme, Kabat-Zinn developed an eight week training system with 
various practices that cultivate mindfulness, with the intention of reducing stress. These 
practices include focus on the breath, sitting meditation, the body-scan technique, yoga 
practices, walking meditation, and loving-kindness meditation. Kabat-Zinn devotes a chapter 
for most of these practices, ending the chapters with practical instructions on the technicalities 
of the practices. First though, he emphasizes that certain fundamental attitudes should be 
cultivated at the start of mindfulness practice, including non-judging, patience, a beginner’s 
mind, trust, non-striving, acceptance and letting go.
194
 These seven attitudes, together with a 
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sense of commitment, self-discipline and intentionality, are supposedly what will make the 
MBSR program most effective for its practitioners.
195
  
Focusing on the breath is an ancient practice, and possibly the most accessible object for 
meditation
196
 as it is autonomous and ever-present in the living organism. Kabat-Zinn 
underlines how breathing is an important element in the healing process, and distinguishes 
between two ways of practicing breathing meditation. The first, deemed formal, is a 
disciplined approach, where you sit down and only focus on the breath. This can be done in 
numerous ways: focusing on the in- and outbreaths by the nostrils or focusing on the 
movements of the abdomen while breathing, and following the breath as if “you were riding 
the waves of your own breathing.”197 The other way of practicing breath-meditation, deemed 
informal, is to be aware of your breathing sometimes throughout the day, tuning in to it at 
different times during the day while noticing the rise and contraction of your abdomen a few 
times. The first week of MBSR at the stress clinic generally starts out with a sitting 
meditation focusing on the feelings of the breath at the belly rather than at the nostrils, as this 
“tends to be particularly relaxing and calming in the early stages of practice.”198 Because 
breathing is remarkably fundamental and effective as an anchor for awareness, it is used as a 
gateway into the other practices used for cultivating mindfulness.
199
 
Sitting meditation is introduced in the second class of the MBSR course. Now, the objects of 
attention starts with the breathing, and is turned into including the sensation of the body just 
sitting; listening and trying to feel sounds; observation of the process of thinking and the 
fluctuating feelings that come and go; and finally just sitting with “Choiceless Awareness,”200 
which Kabat-Zinn defines as being completely open and receptive to whatever comes into the 
field of awareness, letting everything come and go, like passing clouds. In the “Choiceless 
Awareness,” one should not even focus on the breath, but just be completely open to whatever 
arises in the field of consciousness. In the other forms, the breath is used both as a gateway 
into the practice, and as an anchor to which the practitioner can return if concentration is 
dropping and the mind becomes too unstable. The body-scan technique is the third exercise 
that is practiced during the first two weeks of the MBSR course, and the first formal 
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mindfulness practice the participants engage in intensively, meaning 45 minutes per day, six 
days a week, for at least two weeks. It involves lying down and gently going through different 
parts of the body, using the breath and transporting it to different body parts, feeling the 
sensations of the body. The practice involves basically being a detached witness to “your 
breath and your body, region by region, as you scan from the feet to the top of your head.”201 
The practice can work as a purification process, but Kabat-Zinn reiterates the importance of 
non-striving and acceptance for it to be successful – i.e., if the aim of the practice is to purify 
the body, cleansing it of pain and tension, then that intention might can get in the way of 
actually doing so.  
In weeks 3 and 4 of the MBSR course, mindful yoga practices are introduced as the third 
formal practice of mindfulness (along with body scan and sitting meditation), and the 
participants start alternating the body scans with yoga. The yoga postures are based on hatha 
yoga
202, which consists of “gentle stretching and strengthening exercises, done very slowly, 
with moment-to-moment awareness of breathing and the sensations that arise as you put your 
body in various configurations known as `postures.´”203 For Kabat-Zinn yoga is primarily 
used as a practice of being in the body or to “rebody” ourselves, and the side-effects of 
prudent mindful yoga practice include full body conditioning, improving bodily strength, 
balance and muscle flexibility.    
Walking meditation can be practiced both as a formal meditation – in which case one does it 
for an elaborate period of time, slowly and intentionally, with full focus on some or all aspects 
of walking (like the feet, the movement of the torso as the legs are moving, etc.). Or it can be 
practiced as an informal meditation, meaning that it can be practiced in daily life just briefly, 
for a few moments, whenever it feels right.  
Loving-kindness meditation is taught in the MBSR course when the participants practice 
mindfulness for a full day. The full day entails using the full repertoire of practices taught 
over the course of 7 weeks to experiment with mindfulness, plus the new practice of loving-
kindness. This practice can supposedly have powerful effects on many people. It is based on 
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metta practices found in Theravada Buddhism, which are also called compassion meditation 
or loving-kindness meditation. The practice starts out with mindfulness of the breath to calm 
and stabilize the mind. Then, the practitioner tries to invoke feelings of kindness and love 
towards first oneself, then someone he cares about, then someone he might have a particular 
problem with, “someone we do not like to feel sympathy for.”204 The point is to purposefully 
forgive and let go of anger, hatred, fear or whatever tension there might be between the 
practitioner and someone else. To visualize other people, especially those we dislike, as 
people with similar feelings, aspirations, pains and worries can help with forgiveness, either 
of others or of ourselves and our past mistakes against another person or maybe even towards 
ourselves. We can take the practice even further, expanding it towards those we do not know, 
maybe the less fortunate than us, and eventually we can even bring the meditation to include 
the whole planet and every living thing on it. The practice is brought to a close by coming 
back to the breathing, and “cradling our feelings of warmth and generosity and love for all 
beings in our own hearts.”205 The effects of loving-kindness meditation can be, according to 
Kabat-Zinn, that we become kinder and more forgiving towards both ourselves and to others, 
and it can increase our capacity for empathy, meaning that we can better understand the 
motivations of others and appreciate the need of treating other living beings with love and 
kindness. 
Finally, the MBSR course underlines the importance of cultivating mindfulness in daily life
206
 
– not just during the eight week programme, but also afterwards. Whatever one is doing, 
whether it is eating, talking, walking etc., one can always practice present-mindedness. 
Importantly, mindfulness can be interpreted as a techne insofar as it is both a system of 
practices but also a craft of life, a way of being through which one can purportedly learn to 
better cope, self-regulate, and handle whatever comes along in the “full catastrophe” of life. 
Seeing as the techniques for cultivating mindfulness taught in the MBSR programme are 
generally quite accessible and easy to approach, it is not hard to imagine why they have 
enjoyed such success
207
 since the start of the Stress Reduction clinic in 1979. I would argue 
that this combined with Kabat-Zinn’s insistence on the need for making the practice your own 
through experimentation – what I call technical mysticism – are central factors that have 
contributed to making mindfulness practices among the most practiced contemplative 
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techniques in the world today. Also of importance is Kabat-Zinn’s “translational” work, his 
effective re-phrasing of Buddhist vocabulary into concepts understandable to laypeople.  
  
5.4 Conclusion: Health-beneficial Techniques as 
Religious Substitute? 
Mindfulness, then, is a set of practices derived from mainly Buddhist traditions that have been 
accommodated to fit a Western audience. Accordingly, Kabat-Zinn does not view MSBR as a 
decontextualization of the dharma, but rather as an attempt to recontextualize it in its essential 
fullness. I have traced the links between the Pali equivalent of mindfulness (sati) and its 
relation to the technical meditation word vipassana, to the modern context of MBSR. 
Through a process of adapting and translating various practices known under these terms, by 
refocusing them to the concerns of the modern West (how to stay healthy and reduce stress), 
Kabat-Zinn successfully created a fitting system of contemplative practice suited for the 21
st
 
century. I have argued that there are three main reasons for the success of mindfulness: (i) its 
compliance with the subjectivization thesis and the zeitgeist of our times; (ii) its accessibility 
and down-to-earth easy-to-understand guidelines; and most importantly (iii) its emphasis on 
technical mysticism.  
Mindfulness is also a textbook example of my technification thesis, as it shows how 
development of religious practices from different traditions can co-mingle and arise in the 
context of one individual’s transformative experience. The phenomenon of 20th-century Asian 
reform or revivalist Buddhist movements themselves
208
 (which Kabat-Zinn represents), with 
their emphasis on the practicable, instrumental and individualistic elements of Buddhism as 
opposed to the institutional and the overly intellectual elements, can be interpreted as a form 
of technification. This indicates that cultural exchanges can play a significant role in the 
technification process.        
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6 Case study B: From Mindfulness to 
Christfulness 
 
As a Christian I miss a transcendent dimension in Mindfulness, that 
can dissolve the inner tension between conscious presence 
(opmærksamt nærvær) and non-judgment (ikke-dømmen).                         
– Ole S. Madsen (2012)209 
In this chapter, I will examine the conception of christfulness. To do this, I will use the only 
available textual material about christfulness, namely a short introduction booklet published by 
the main architect of the term in 2012, a booklet simply called christfulness. In addition, the 
respective websites of the two organizations that are directly involved in the spread of this 
praxis will also be used as primary source materials, namely www.imesterenslyd.dk and 
www.areopagos.no. These websites reveal vital information on the issues, history and origins, 
doctrines, organizational structure, courses, lectures, seminars, etc. of these two organizations.  
6.1 The Origins of Christfulness 
Christfulness is an expression coined by the Danish Christian minister Ole Skjerbæk Madsen, 
applied for the first time in Copenhagen in November 2011, at a convention called “The 
Universe of Mysticism”210. Based on very positive feedback on both the term and the various 
practices taught and associated with it in 2011 and 2012, Madsen decided to develop the 
concept further. The result became what we have today – a concept called christfulness that 
embodies the most common forms of the abovementioned mindfulness practices (see chapter 
5), mixed together with Orthodox spiritual contemplative practices, especially the Jesus 
prayer. At first glance, the christfulness-practices seem like a Christ-centric form of 
mindfulness – a Christian alternative to the world’s arguably most popular contemplative 
technique –, but in reality, it is much richer and more complex. 
In his explanation of why he thinks there is a need for christfulness as a Christian practice, 
Madsen writes, “Christfulness encapsulates a biblically based understanding of man as 
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person, i.e. that man is not only understood out of himself, but also out of his relations – to 
God and to other people.”211 Madsen is not skeptical of mindfulness per se – in fact, he calls it 
a complementary practice to christfulness, and praises its ability to increase conscious 
awareness and stimulate a non-judgmental attitude. Although “many practitioners point out 
mindfulness as a religious neutral practice,”212 Madsen disagrees with this and argues that 
mindfulness cannot be fully divorced from its Buddhist origins. He assesses the two main 
developing trajectories that the whole mindfulness system has gone through: (i) – 
“Mindfulness (…) as a secularized form of Eastern spirituality, “213 and (ii) – “Mindfulness is 
also a part of the wave of popularized and secularized Buddhism, coming to the fore in our 
time’s postmodern and fluctuating spiritual and therapeutic environments.”214 Madsen points 
out a very important element of the modern Mindfulness Movement’s Buddhist roots: that 
mindfulness can lead to an experience of emptiness, which can be interpreted both in a 
positive and negative way. Positive, in the sense that one is freed from the illusions that bind 
us to the shackles of the past and the future, in short, that keeps us trapped in the world of the 
senses. In the negative sense, emptiness can feel like a dissolving of the personality or the 
ego. This can be very unpleasant and feel threatening.  
A last but crucial element of Madsen’s “critique” of mindfulness is that it is missing a 
transcendent dimension. Awareness, non-judgmental presence and the loosening up of old 
engrained habits are commonly described qualities of both mindfulness and christfulness, and 
for this reason, they are seen as complementary practices. However, if there is no transcendent 
dimension to the practice, no normative force (whether it is a Christian Deity or practices of 
compassion and loving-kindness), there is always a danger that the non-judgmental attitude 
can lead to “a disengaged relationship to your fellow beings and the suffering of the world, an 
acceptance of the status quo, a fatalistic attitude to life.”215 In other words, there is an inner 
tension between non-judgment and awareness or conscious presence. This tension comes 
about because the former can induce apathy, while the latter is usually conducive for 
developing empathy. In traditional Buddhism, this tension is resolved by cultivating loving-
kindness (i.e. compassion), usually referred to as metta practices in Theravada Buddhism, and 
tonglen (giving and taking) in Tibetan Buddhism. Metta practices are also taught in some 
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modern mindfulness contexts (e.g. MBSR-courses), but the most common understanding of 
mindfulness today, based on Kabat-Zinn’s famous operational definition, does not include the 
expressed cultivation of empathy. As I discussed in the last chapter, many contemporary 
Buddhists would agree with Madsen’s critique of mindfulness’ potential lack of ethical 
impetus. The ethical force of christfulness lies in it being grounded on a biblical interpretation 
of man as a relational being – “not just understood out of himself, but also out of his relations 
– to God and to other people.”216 Christian ontology differs radically from Buddhism, and 
Madsen argues that for the Christian “there is nothing illusory about life in the world, for the 
world is created and willed by God. And as created in the image of God, man stands in a 
serving relationship to his fellow creation.”217 From the Christian perspective, cultivating a 
non-judgmental attitude to our fellow beings is done by following the example of the way 
Christ interacted with other people. “The Christian lives in an I-You-relation to God.”218 This 
relationship must be reflected in the relation to co-beings and co-creation, and it is precisely 
this transcendence, according to Madsen, that mindfulness is missing
219
. With christfulness, 
Madsen seeks to express a relation to his fellow man and fellow creation impressed by Christ, 
“by his presence and appreciative attitude towards people on their path.”220       
 
6.2 The techne of Christfulness 
To understand the practices involved in christfulness, we first need to comprehend and clearly 
define what christfulness is. Madsen describes christfulness like being “filled or saturated by 
Christ, surrounded and fully pierced by him.”221 Christfulness is understood as a process 
consisting of several phases – not just happening necessarily once or at specific one-time-only 
peak events, but rather as a continuous spiraling movement. Madsen himself describes 
sometimes reaching a particular silence and hearing the voice of Christ when he meditates on 
words and stories from the Bible. He calls these inspirations, to avoid misrepresenting himself 
                                                 
216
 (Madsen 2012, 7) 
217
 (Madsen 2012, 8) 
218
 (Madsen 2012, 8)  
219
  (Madsen 2012, 8) 
220
 (Madsen 2012, 8) 
221
 (Madsen 2012, 9) 
63 
 
as a 100% pure channel for God, and clarifies that these inspirations are distinct from 
prophecy or other gifts of revelation.
222
 
Madsen separates four distinct components or phases of christfulness, representing different 
aspects and stages of contemplative development. He writes: “(…) Christfulness 
begins as an experience of God’s love in Christ as a protecting and guiding presence (Christ with me) 
is an experience of “Christ in me, the hope of glory [herlighedens håp]” (Christ in me) 
helps you to see Christ or God’s image in your fellow man (Christ in you), and 
leads to a vision of a redeemed [forløst] humanity as the Body of Christ (I/we in Christ)”223 
As we can see from these four components or stages, the very first one, Christ with me, starts 
with an experience of God’s love in Christ, an experience of “safety and certainty of being a 
child of God.”224 The practices that can be involved in this stage include meditation on the 
Bible, affirmations and prayers, and a specific christfulness mantra.
225
 The second stage, 
Christ in me, has classically been realized by practicing the Jesus prayer of the Hesychasts, 
also called “the prayer of the heart.”226 The advantages of the Jesus prayer lies in its 
simplicity according to Madsen
227
, and breathing patterns and physical postures can be 
combined and synchronized with different parts of the prayer as aids for concentration. The 
prayer itself goes as follows in the Orthodox Church: Lord, Jesus Christ, Son of God, have 
mercy on me, a sinner. Other versions are shorter and more popular, like this one: (Lord) 
Jesus Christ, have mercy on me.
228
 Clearly influenced by the Orthodox tradition, Madsen 
argues for the necessity of healing the heart and thereby realizing that “every human being is 
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 Hesychasm can be called the spiritual tradition of the Orthodox Church, derived from the Greek word 
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created in God’s image with the purpose of growing to Godliness.”229 To do this, to realize 
Christ in me, Madsen says that the inner human needs to reflect “God in God’s request to 
me.”230 The mirror of the inner human is covered by everything that separates us from God – 
this is mainly conceptions we have of God, ourselves and other people that often create 
distance between ourselves and everything else and do not necessarily reflect reality – and 
this happens because of objectification, according to Madsen.
231
 When we have made other 
people and God into mere things or objects, we immediately separate ourselves from the 
present moment and live in the past or the future, missing out on God’s presence available in 
the now – all because we have made these things into “something to want to own, something 
to fear, something to win, something to lose.”232 Through prayer, especially the Jesus 
prayer
233
, through aids for concentration and narrowing our focus, accessing the present 
moment becomes easier. Then, being in the present moment, one can more easily lay aside 
those distractions and false impressions and just be. Leaving all impressions and thoughts 
behind can be scary and feel lonely, but Madsen stresses that one is not alone – because 
“Christ is in you, the hope of glory” (Col. 1,27). 
Christ in you is the natural progression from the two latter phases. From the experience of 
Christ with me, the first phase, one gains reassurance and faith in the presence of God in one’s 
own life, which according to Madsen leads naturally to the second phase of Christ in me. 
Christfulness leads to a conscious presence in the world, through Christ-awareness. This 
awareness then makes us see Christ in others. “We scout for God’s image in the other. That is 
why Jesus teaches us to love our enemies and pray for those who persecute us.”234 Through 
this third phase, we can learn to break our conceptions of other people as enemies, especially 
when dealing with people of other faiths or when we feel that “people abuse parts of our faith 
practice and mixes it with what to us seem like alien expressions of faith.”235 In this phase, 
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practices of being present, visualizing Christ, and the Disciple prayer
236
, are all meant to 
deepen that sense of brotherhood and fraternity in seeing Christ in others. This shows a rather 
radical religious tolerance, but which makes sense when considering the organizational 
background of Madsen, which will be discussed in the next section. Finally, the fourth and 
final stage of christfulness, I/we in Christ, is related to a vision or inspiration Madsen had 
about the Eucharist as an expression for the community in Christ, as part of one body sharing 
the hope of a renewed and redeemed humanity.
237
                              
The aims of christfulness are both personal and grand. The main purpose, writes Madsen, is 
“to describe a process that moves from an individual experience to a vision for the salvation 
of mankind and the healing of our planet – in an ongoing interaction between the individual 
and the relational, the personal and the universal.”238 Through the abovementioned 
christfulness-practices, one can supposedly find answers to major questions such as: what is a 
human being? Who am I? What is the meaning of life? The practices that might produce 
answers to such questions include visualizations, meditations – on bible passages, on the life 
of Christ, etc., prayers – including affirmations and intercessions, regulation of the breath, 
recitation, body awareness and present-mindedness. Christfulness is, in other words, a myriad 
of spiritual practices
239
 that are meant to help an individual to be attentive and non-judgmental 
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earth and humanity and especially for the unity between people of good will.” The prayer goes like this:  
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For the salvation of man and the earth 
- With a humble mind, in purity, truth and love.” (Madsen 2012, 25) 
237
 (Madsen 2012, 29-32) 
238
 (Madsen 2012, 4) 
239
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breath to let go of everything that weighs you down, old impressions of yourself, others, God, etc., and 
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towards oneself, other people, and God. It is a contemplative interpretation of the Gospel (and 
the bible generally), and an attempt to embody the teachings of Christ through a harmonic 
combination of the missiological and ascetic ideals of Christianity.     
 
6.3 Areopagos’ meditation project and the IML [I 
Mesterens Lys] 
It is no coincidence that there seem to be strong linkage between christfulness and so-called 
New Age spirituality, the latter especially characterized by its openness and syncretic nature. 
To further understand why christfulness entails such an open and tolerant view on other 
religions and spiritual practices, we need to look at the Christian organizations Areopagos and 
the IML.  
Areopagos is an organization founded by the Norwegian Christian missionary Karl Ludvig 
Reichelt (1877-1952), who spent several decades in China. In 1926 he founded The Nordic 
Christian Buddhist Mission (or the Nordic-East Asia Mission) which was later renamed 
Areopagos. Deeply influenced and fascinated by Chinese culture and spirituality, Reichelt 
would develop a way of spreading the gospel that was more tolerant and inclusive of the 
already existent tradition in the place of missionary activity, in this case Chinese Buddhism 
and Daoism. His views on missionary work became the inspiration for the interfaith work 
Areopagos does to this day. According to their website, Areopagos define themselves as “an 
organisation that works with religious dialogue and studies, Christian spirituality and relief. 
We started in 1922, and now work in Norway, Denmark, China and Hongkong.”240 The main 
goal of Areopagos is to share the gospel in a religiously pluralistic and secularised world. 
They offer an ecumenical service grounded on a Lutheran heritage, and have throughout the 
years worked with creating a dialogical approach to people of other faiths than Christian, 
establishing a spirituality fertilized in the meeting between Christian and Eastern spirituality, 
                                                                                                                                                        
consequently using every in-breath to receive peace, happiness and love from the open heart of Jesus Christ. 
Also, for every in-breath, you imagine your heart and mind being cleansed more and more, and Christ 
increasingly taking residence in your heart and mind. When the practice comes to a close, the finishing out-
breaths should be used to send out the peace and joy of Jesus Christ to the world around you. The practice is 
finished by saying this prayer: “May God’s peace, which surpasses all reason, keep our hearts and thoughts in 
Christ Jesus, our Lord.” (Madsen 2012, 34)    
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studying Eastern religiosity and spiritual currents affected by it, and doing diaconal work 
meeting people in need of relief. Together with their Chinese partners, Areopagos wants to 
ground the Christian gospel in Chinese culture and spirituality. In Scandinavia, the 
organisation wants to be a link between Christianity and other faith groups, and works for 
increased dialogue and the establishment of faith praxis involving contemplation, insight and 
respect for creation, and meditation.
241
  
In 2013, Areopagos started a meditation project. This project, which is ongoing until 2015, 
intends to re-actualize and normalize meditation as a Christian practice, and make it more 
accessible to the public. To do this, Areopagos will: “elaborate, clarify and express what 
meditation is; collect and adapt experiences with different forms of meditation; make the 
Christian traditions of meditation relevant in today’s search for life mastery and for finding 
meaning and deeper understanding; motivate churches and church organizations and 
institutions to open up for meditation and use it in their work.”242 The project does not only 
want to create a buzz of new activity, but also aims to express values and principles. The 
following values are underlined as particularly important in the project description: “Faith 
practice – to live close to God and one’s true self; discover God’s presence in everything; 
God’s incomprehensiveness – mysticism; maturation of faith; deeper mastery of life, healing 
from within; unity in Jesus Christ.” The principles guiding the project are: “Praxis-oriented; 
reflection and studies; spiritual guidance; wandering together [medvandring] and dialogue; 
co-action and network.”243     
The IML, or In the Light of the Master [I Mesterens Lys], is an Areopagos practice, dedicated 
to building bridges between Christians and people of alternative environments, and to be a 
community of disciples of Jesus in the new spiritual environments. “IML started in 
Copenhagen in 1995 with “spiritual meetings” and has since developed into a wide-reaching 
work in Denmark and Norway.”244 IML was started by Ole Skjerbæk Madsen, the originator 
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6.4 Conclusion: The Transformation of Religious 
Terminology 
In this chapter, I have researched what christfulness is, its relation to mindfulness, and the 
organisational background from which it came. Christfulness can be called a techne insofar as 
it gives an account or rationale for its practices, and because it emphasizes the technical 
aspects over the theoretical (one example of this is that about half of Madsen’s booklet 
consists solely of practical how-to and manuals for christfulness practice). It is therefore a 
very good example of technification (as defined in chapter 4), because of its superior focus on 
the mystical-intuitive element of Christianity, at the expense of the intellectual and 
institutional elements. Christfulness is similar to mindfulness in form, but has in addition a 
transcendent dimension, which gives it an ethical impetus that critics say is lacking in modern 
mindfulness practice. Christfulness as a myriad of different approaches to contemplative 
practices interpreted through the gospels. It is worth noting that even though the praxis can be 
called non-denominational – i.e., a practice that works for all Christians and non-Christians – 
almost all of the practices described in the primary text presuppose a Trinitarian view of God. 
This, of course, could exclude Non-Trinitarian groups. 
There is no doubt, and Madsen also attests to, that the word christfulness is a way of 
“rebranding” an already popular term, mindfulness, and use the latter’s inherent popularity as 
an advertising strategy. Because christfulness is such a new term, it is too early to tell whether 
it will catch on and spread like wildfire as its more popular name-brother has done since the 
1990s. The future success or failure of christfulness will most likely hinge on whether 
christfulness practice will take hold among the people and rebranders of Christian 
contemplative practice in Scandinavia. Areopagos’ current meditation project certainly makes 
such a scenario possible, and there is no clear sign that the trend towards more technicity of 




7 Case Study C: From Contemplative 
to Centering Prayer 
 
Gud er alltid i presens.
 246
   
–Hilde Sanden-Bjønnes, Centering prayer instructor 
Centering prayer [is] a contemporary form of prayer of the heart, prayer of 
simplicity, prayer of faith, prayer of simple regard; a method of reducing the 
obstacles to the gift of contemplative prayer and of facilitating the development of 
habits conducive to responding to the inspirations of the Spirit.  
– Thomas Keating247 
Centering prayer is a relatively new name for an old form of prayer with roots going all the 
way back to the earliest stages of Christendom. It is a modernized form of classical 
contemplative prayer developed and popularized by three American Cistercian monks, 
namely William Meninger, M. Basil Pennington and Thomas Keating
248
. In the following, I 
will explore what the historical roots are between contemplative and centering prayer, and 
examine the definition of centering prayer, how one practices it, and the supposed outcomes 
that can be expected from such practicing. I will base my investigation on two major works 
by Thomas Keating. The first, Open Mind, Open Heart –The Contemplative Dimension of the 
Gospel (1992), details the technicalities of the practice, and how to implement it in daily life. 
The other work, Invitation to Love – The Way of Christian Contemplation (2006), is described 
as a kind of road map of the contemplative path, a thorough run-through of what to expect 
(and not to expect) once one starts practicing centering prayer seriously. These books are 
collected in a trilogy (Foundations for Centering Prayer and the Christian Contemplative 
Life, 2002), but are sufficient for the purposes of this chapter, which is to look at the technical 
aspects of centering prayer.  
Thomas Keating (b. 1923) is a priest, monk and abbot who currently resides at St. Benedict’s 
Monastery in Snowmass, Colorado. He is founder of the Centering Prayer Movement and of 
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249, the latter being an organization intent on fostering “the process of 
transformation in Christ in one another through the practice of Centering prayer.”250 The 
organization’s website, www.contemplativeoutreach.org/, will also be used as primary source 
material for this chapter. 
7.1 From Christian Coenobitism
251
 to Laymen’s 
Spirituality 
To understand the difference between contemplative and centering prayer, it is necessary to 
look at how the popularizers of centering prayer – i.e. Thomas Keating et al. – understand the 
term contemplation. Keating argues that contemplation is an ambiguous term that has 
espoused several meanings over the centuries. He traces a line of biblical translation and 
commentary going from the Hebrew da´ath to the Greek term gnosis, and then to the Greek 
Fathers’ incorporation of the Neoplatonist term theoria, which in its Latin form is translated 
as contemplatio. Da´ath indicates an intimate kind of knowledge of God through love 
“involving the whole person, not just the mind.”252 In the Greek Bible, the translation for this 
Hebrew term is gnosis, to emphasize the experiential knowledge of God. Furthermore, the 
usage of gnosis in the Epistles of St. Paul refers according to Keating to “the knowledge of 
God proper to those who love Him.”253 The Greek Church Fathers, especially Clement of 
Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, and Origen, borrowed the term theoria – originally meaning 
the intellectual vision of truth – from the Neoplatonists254, but added the meaning of the 
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 “Inspired by the decree of Vatican II,” three monks – Fathers Thomas Keating, William Meninger, and Basil 
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Hebrew da´ath to it. Thus, the term theoria in its expanded meaning – denoting the 
experiential knowledge of God through love – was translated into the “Latin contemplatio and 
handed down to us in the Christian tradition.”255 
The most common form of prayer advocated for both monastics and laypeople alike in the 
first centuries of Christianity was according to Keating the method called lectio divina, 
literally meaning “divine reading.”256 This was a practice of reading, listening and reflecting 
on scripture, involving the body in the process of ever-deepening focused attention on the 
material they were reading and reciting. Keating describes the process of lectio divina: 
The reflective part, pondering upon the words of the sacred text, was called meditatio, “meditation”. 
The spontaneous movement of the will in response to these reflections was called oratio, “affective 
prayer”. As these reflections and acts of will simplified, one moved on to a state of resting in the 
presence of God, and that is what was meant by contemplatio, “contemplation”. These three acts – 
discursive meditation, affective prayer and contemplation – might all take place during the same period 
of prayer. They were interwoven one into the other.
257
        
In other words, contemplation took on the meaning of an advanced superlative stage of 
prayer, a type of resting in the presence of God. Indeed, ascetical practices “were always 
directed toward contemplation as the proper goal of every spiritual practice.”258 This meaning 
of contemplation was upheld until the end of the Middle Ages. 
In the 12
th
 century, the advent of scholasticism and the development of the great schools of 
theology meant an increased focus on analysis and Aristotelian pedantry. While this shift and 
development in intellectual history meant better philosophical sophistication, it also initiated 
the end of the simple understanding of prayer. Over the next centuries, the complexity of 
prayer methods and the categories involved in prayer analysis increased rapidly. During the 
16
th
-century, the term mental prayer appeared, and prayer 
came to be divided into discursive meditation if thoughts predominated; affective prayer if the emphasis 
was on acts of the will; and contemplation if graces infused by God were predominant. Discursive 
meditation, affective prayer and contemplation were no longer different acts found in a single period of 
prayer, but distinct forms of prayer, each with its own proper aim, method and purpose. This division of 
the development of prayer into compartmentalized units entirely separate from one another helped to 
further the incorrect notion that contemplation was an extraordinary grace reserved for the few. The 
possibility of prayer opening out into contemplation tended to be regarded as very unlikely. The organic 
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development of prayer toward contemplation did not fit into the approved categories and was therefore 
discouraged.
259
     
This compartmentalization of Christian mental prayer in especially the Roman-Catholic 
tradition coincided with other historical developments. The extremely influential Spiritual 
Exercises by Saint Ignatius, which was written between 1522 and 1526, is essential according 
to Keating, for understanding the present state of spirituality in the Roman Catholic Church. 
Ignatius used the term contemplation differently than its traditional meaning. In the Exercises, 
contemplation means gazing upon a concrete object of the imagination – seeing the people of 
the Gospel “as if they were present, hearing what they are saying, relating and responding to 
their words and actions.”260 This method aims at developing affective prayer. Two other 
major methods of prayer are proposed in the Exercises, namely discursive meditation and the 
application of the five senses. However, the Jesuits themselves after Ignatius
261
 contributed to 
a trend that, to a large extent, has reduced the Exercises to a manual of purely discursive 
meditation. In the Catholic world, the pervasive influence of the Jesuits in the post-
Reformation era as the main representatives of the Counter-Reformation helps explain why 
not contemplative prayer, but only one of its heavily intellectualized components – i.e. 
discursive meditation – took root and spread as the main form of Christian spiritual practice in 
the world of Catholicism.
262
 
Keating goes on to identify two additional historical reasons for why the focus on 
contemplative spirituality – understood in the traditional Christian sense as abiding with God, 
experientially, not just being an act of intellectual reflecting or “gazing” – diminished and 
increasingly lost support with the Roman Catholic authorities. One proposed important reason 
was the number of declared heresies or “species of false mysticisms” that occurred during the 
17
th
 century. Quietism (condemned in 1687 by Innocent XII
263
), semi-Quietism (condemned 
in France and blamed for bringing traditional mysticism into disrepute) and Jansenism (which 
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left behind a pervasive anti-human attitude that continued well into our own century)
 264
 all 
led to a further setback of Christian spirituality, according to Keating. A second reason, 
related to the aforementioned, was that contemplative prayer gradually came to be seen as an 
arrogant pursuit, something only for the spiritually elect, the religious virtuosi, the 
superhuman ascetic monks (and sometimes nuns), who comprised an infinitesimal minority of 
the Christian community.  
From the abovementioned, it is clear that the term contemplation has undergone a noticeable 
change and development of meaning over the centuries. Traditionally, and certainly in the 
popular mind, one tends to think of contemplatives and contemplative practice as something 
confined to the walls of the cloister. Indeed, Christian mysticism and contemplative 
development has primarily been associated with coenobitical monks (i.e. monastics living in a 
community), as if contemplation were the prerogative of the clergy and the religious elite. 
However, today, and also in the first millennia of Christendom before the Great Schism of 
1054, there existed a common Christian spirituality, as Keating and others have shown
265
. 
This spirituality was not just for the elite, but also for the laypeople. Contemplation was held 
as “the normal evolution of a genuine spiritual life”266 and was therefore open to all 
Christians.  
Today, and in recent decades, the status and prominence of contemplation have begun to 
change. Keating believes there are two main reasons for this renewed interest in Christian 
contemplation. The first reason is that theological and historical studies have rediscovered and 
increasingly seen the value of the teachings of spiritual masters such as John of the Cross, 
John Cassian, and others
267
. The second reason is the challenge posed by the spiritual 
traditions of the East in the post-World War II era. The popularity and success of meditation-
based traditions and of yoga system – many of which are contemplative and technically 
similar to the Christian contemplative tradition – have filled an obvious demand for spiritual 
nourishment in the West. Many methods of meditation have been very well received in the 
West, and have produced good results. Some methods have enjoyed a lot of publicity, 
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. In line with Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to 
Non-Christian Religions (Vatican II), Keating stresses the importance for Christian leaders 
and teachers to know about and appreciate the knowledge and methods of the Eastern spiritual 
traditions. This is primarily because they need to meet people “where they are today,”269 and 
it is not uncommon for the majority of spiritual seekers of the West today to have studied 
some of the wisdom from the East.        
Keating argues that there is an overly intellectual bias in Western culture. He believes this has 
come about because of inclinations from the Cartesian-Newtonian world-view that likes and 
needs to analyze everything. The consequence has been a bottling up of the spontaneous mind 
and a repression of our intuitive faculties. “This conceptual hang-up of modern Western 
society,” says Keating “impedes the spontaneous movement from reflection to spontaneous 
prayer and from spontaneous prayer to interior silence (wonder and admiration).”270 Having 
observed what he calls the “intellectual bias” of Western culture in people who are into 
contemplative prayer, Keating believes that it is much deeper than most people realize, and 
that the “rush to the East”271 is symptomatic of what is lacking in the West. So in response to 
critics who question whether it is in line with the tradition of contemplative prayer to focus 
purely on contemplatio (which is non-discursive), at the expense of meditatio (which is 
discursive), Keating responds that centering prayer is “an insight into a contemporary 
problem and an effort to revive the traditional Christian teaching on contemplative prayer.”272 
The contemporary problem is the intellectual bias and lack of intuitive spontaneity among 
modern and mainly Western practitioners. There is a need for an experiential refocus, a 
method or means of rediscovering the traditional teaching on contemplative prayer, which 
according to Keating can lead to experiences of God’s presence. That refocus from using a 
prayer of concentration (e.g. discursive meditation, which has been prevalent since the latter 
stages of medieval times) to instead apply a prayer of being (e.g. centering prayer, which has 
been popular for only a few decades), and methodically mapping out the ways to do so, is 
what centering prayer is all about. Therefore, Keating says that centering prayer is not 
something new that was invented in our day, but rather a new “packaging” or “branding” (my 
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terms) of an old tradition, an attempt to update and put order and regularity to spiritual 
teachings (from e.g. The Cloud of Unknowing)
273
 that were perceived to have been lost since 
the Reformation, but turned out to be sorely needed in the modern era.  
The idea of laypeople pursuing the spiritual path is not a new idea. However, it has not been 
popular in the Christian (particularly Catholic) world for the last millennia or so. According to 
Keating, this has roots going back to the institutionalization of monasticism after the example 
of desert Fathers such as that of St. Anthony, which pretty much solidified and standardized 
the notion that one had to leave the world in order to pursue the Christian path to divine 
union. However, some early Christian thinkers, such as Origen (4
th
-century) of the theological 
school of Alexandria, believed that the Christian community in the world (my emphasis) was 
the proper place for ascesis
274
. Nowadays, after a few decades of centering prayer increasingly 
making its impact felt on the consciousness of Christendom, there seems to be a shift away 
from the (latest) traditional view on how to best pursue the Christian inner life. Keating’s 
adage on the essence of monastic life is probably partly responsible for this shift. He writes: 
“The essence of monastic life is not its structures but its interior practice, and the heart of 
interior practice is contemplative prayer.”275 In this respect, it is clear that centering prayer 
reflects a democratizing inclusive view of the contemplative work. It is also an example of 
technification, as an expression of the experiential-intuitive and non-discursive elements of 
Christianity at the expense of, and partially as a reaction to, the institutional and intellectual 
(discursive) elements. Contemplation is not just something for those who forsake the world, 
but rather something for all believers and spiritual seekers. Even though belief in the central 
tenets of Christianity is considered elementary for Keating and other exponents of centering 
prayer, some practitioners and teachers of the prayer method believe that also non-Christians 
can (and should) practice centering prayer. Supposedly, centering prayer can be efficacious 
and suitable for non-Christians as well, because of its non-discursive nature.
276
 If this is true, 
then the practice is obviously fitting for ecumenical and dialogical purposes.   
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7.2 The techne of Centering Prayer 
The techne of centering prayer is about why and how one practices it. According to Keating, 
the purpose of centering prayer is “not to experience peace but to evacuate the unconscious 
obstacles to the permanent abiding state of union with God. Not contemplative prayer but the 
contemplative state is the purpose of our practice.”277 A single-event experience or vision, a 
life changing revelation or moment of spiritual awakening is not the main aim. Rather, the 
purpose of practicing centering prayer is to reach “the permanent and abiding awareness of 
God that comes through the mysterious restructuring of consciousness. (…) The restructuring 
of consciousness is the fruit of regular practice.”278 Thus, through regular practice, it is 
supposedly possible to abide in God-presence at all times. Further, a person who is seriously 
practicing contemplative prayer initiates a development of inner transformation. The 
transformative power of contemplation is tangible yet so pure, that according to Keating it is 
“not perceptible to the one receiving it.”279 An individual who has undergone the full 
development of contemplative prayer will embody the gospel and the divine in ways superior 
to even the sacraments, according to Keating. As such, it is clear that the work of 
contemplative practice is the most important component of a Christian’s spiritual life and 
discipline.  
Practicing centering prayer involves gradually changing one’s personality, but not just in a 
moral sense. “The inner dynamism of contemplative prayer leads naturally to the 
transformation of your whole personality. Its purpose is not limited to your moral 
improvement. It brings about a change in your way of perceiving and responding to reality.” 
280
 In other words, centering prayer can be seen as a cognitive and affective tool – cognitive 
because it will alter one’s understanding of reality; affective because it changes the way one 
feels, responds and relates to others, and one’s own feelings and emotions.  
The quote at the start of this chapter is from the glossary of Keating’s instruction manual, 
wherein he defines centering prayer as “a contemporary form of prayer of the heart, prayer of 
simplicity, prayer of faith, prayer of simple regard.”281 Appreciating the simple, non-
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 character of centering prayer is important to understand 
the technicalities of the practice. The practice is passive and non-forced in the sense that it 
aims to rest in the available present by opening oneself up to what is understood as the 
ultimate condition of reality – namely god. Centering prayer is “a method of reducing the 
obstacles to the gift of contemplative prayer and of facilitating the development of habits 
conducive to responding to the inspirations of the Spirit.”283 In other words, although being a 
contemplative practice, it is meant as a help to the active Christian life. The practice is 
receptive rather than concentrative, and hence its focal point is on non-doing instead of 
directed action, on acceptance instead of enforced control. 
 The actual technicalities of practicing centering prayer can be divided into four parts:  
(1) – Choosing a sacred word as the symbol of your intention to consent to God’s presence and action 
within. 
(2) – Sitting comfortably and with eyes closed, settle briefly, and silently introduce the sacred word as the 
symbol of your consent to God’s presence and action within 
(3) – When you become aware of thoughts, return ever-so-gently  to the sacred word internally (This is the 
only activity we initiate during centering prayer). 
(4) – At the end of the prayer, remain in silence with your eyes closed for a couple of minutes.284 
 
The first step of choosing a sacred word is very individual. In other words, what word one 
chooses can change according to circumstance and disposition. However, it is important to 
stick to the same word for the duration of a practice, and generally, it is not recommended to 
switch around all the time. Keating recommends that an initial brief period of prayer to the 
Holy Spirit should be done, asking for inspiration to find a word that is especially suitable for 
us. It is preferable to use a short word with only one or two syllables. Examples of words that 
can be used include: Lord, Jesus, Abba, Father, Mother, Love, Peace, Hope, Shalom, Silence, 
Mercy, etc.  
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The second step involves reaching a calm state and preparing the body for deep silence. 
Keating maintains that it is better to choose a time of day to practice when one is not too 
drowsy or tired. The position of the body can vary, but the important thing is that it is 
comfortable enough to enjoy deep relaxation for a prolonged time, while not being too 
relaxed as to encourage sleep. The back should be kept straight during the practice. Then, 
once a certain bodily calm is established, one can “introduce the sacred word inwardly and as 
gently as laying a feather on a piece of absorbent cotton.”285    
The third step or element of centering prayer is the most important and the most difficult to 
grasp. It involves both letting go of one’s attachment to whatever thoughts (which for Keating 
is an umbrella term for every mental perception including sense perceptions, feelings, images, 
memories, reflections, and commentaries
286
) that might appear, and using the chosen sacred
287
 
word to gently come back to the awareness of the present whenever it slips away. Indeed, the 
way the sacred word is used to re-focus oneself within the practice is the determining factor as 
to whether the prayer will work out successfully or not according to Keating.
288
 Therefore, a 
type of self-denial is essential in this practice, as one has to deny one’s attachments to all 
forms of mental movements, again and again – a process which is so habitual in the human 
consciousness that it quickly becomes clear to the practitioner that this is no easy task to 
accomplish. Essentially, the prayer is a path to or method of self-surrender
289
, through which 
one supposedly can learn to be less possessive, and eventually be able to let go of everything 
that is keeping you away from god, no matter how tempting the thought, reflection, insight or 
experience that is happening during the practice might be. According to Keating, it is 
important to stress that the sacred word is used as the intention to get in touch with god and 
continually bring oneself back to, and rest in, his omnipresence. Therefore the sacred word 
might become vague or even disappear during the course of the practice, as it does not 
implicitly represent the method itself, but is rather the intention behind one’s willingness to 
open up to the divine and experiment with the possibility of experiencing “divine therapy”290 
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through such self-disciplining. If such complete inner stillness is achieved, the sacred word 
disappears completely, there are no thoughts, and one might experience an interior silence 
which Keating also calls “resting in God.”291      
The prayer is brought to a close by spending a few minutes with the eyes closed. An optional 
prayer, e.g. Our Father, can be done at the end. These additional minutes give the psyche time 
to readjust to the external world. Further, it is recommended that the practice should last at 
least 20 minutes, and be done twice a day. Most people will need time to properly relax and 
cultivate that inner stillness and presence. Keating applies the analogy of cultivating a new 
friendship – if you want to be well acquainted you need to invest time to get to know each 
other
292
. Likewise, the practice of centering prayer needs time and experimentation on our 
behalf to bear fruits.  
Finally, Keating makes a point to emphasize what contemplation (which he uses 
synonymously with centering prayer) is not. Centering prayer is not a technique, relaxation 
exercise, form of self-hypnosis, charismatic gift, parapsychological phenomenon, discursive 
meditation, affective prayer, nor limited to the “felt” presence of god.293 Rather, it is 
movement towards communion with Christ through a training of noticing god’s language 
(which is silence according to Keating) and presence; an essential and practical tool for 
“confronting the heart of Christian ascesis – namely, the struggle with our unconscious 
motivation – while at the same time establishing a climate and necessary dispositions for a 
deepening relationship with God and leading, if we persevere, to divine union.”294   
7.3 Conclusion: “Gud er alltid i presens” 
In this chapter I have tried to explicate the origin and practice of centering prayer, and how 
one of its main exponents, Thomas Keating, presents its methodology and relation to 
contemplative prayer and the history of Christian contemplative life since the Desert Fathers. 
Arguably, Keating’s insistence on the contemporary need for this non-discursive a-intellectual 
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contemplative practice and his emphasis on the spontaneous, intuitive and felt spirituality of 
contemplative trajectories generally, and centering prayer specifically, is an example of 
technification. Furthermore, I have tried to show that the practice of centering prayer 
underscores the importance of presence and non-doing, receptiveness and non-striving. It 
accentuates intention to receive rather than concentrated will to obtain, and is hence 
intentional but non-instrumental. Keating points out (although briefly) that there is a 
misleading distinction between apophatic (presence-oriented) and kataphatic (direction-
oriented) contemplation, as they de facto comprise mutually dependent modalities of 
contemplation. This apparent paradox will be discussed in chapter 9. 
In conclusion, centering prayer represents a novel (yet according to Keating traditional) piece 
of Christian tradition that interprets the Gospels contemplatively, and emphasizes the 
omnipresence and availability of god to the layperson and religious specialist alike. Through a 
process of de-habitualization, of removing everything that separates oneself from the Now, it 
is supposedly possible to invite god-presence into one’s being. To do this however, requires 


















PART III – 





8 The Anatomy of Contemplative 
Practice 
In this chapter, I will use the material summarized in part II as a contemplative database to 
address the main issue of this dissertation. The main issue of my research has been to examine 
how contemplative practice can be seen as a form of techne. As techne is related to the 
practical know-how and bringing forth of that which cannot bring itself about, the answer to 
this inquiry will be most clearly reached by dividing the analysis into three questions: 1) – 
what are the fundamental elements of contemplative practice, 2) – how well do they fit my 
definition of contemplative practice, and 3) – what can contemplative practice mean and 
entail for the practitioner? I shall argue that according to the material, there are significant and 
important similarities between these different systems of practice, despite some obvious 
dissimilarities. Based on my “mystical” hermeneutical reading and re-reading of the primary 
source material, and my practicing of the techniques prescribed therein, I shall endeavor to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of contemplative practice. 
I will start out by summarizing the main similarities and differences between the cases in 
terms of their described technicalities, side-effects, aims, objects of focus, and potential 
worth. As will be shown, contemplative practice from an insider practitioner’s perspective is 
no magical pill or cure-all elixir. Certainly, its proponents stress the wonderful and positive 
effects contemplative practice might have in our lives, but importantly, they also underscore 
how the contemplative process can be paved with difficulties, bitterness, even danger. Finally, 
I will include the neuroscientific concept of neuroplasticity, which is important to evaluate in 
the discussion of what exactly contemplative practice can mean for the practitioner.          
8.1 Comparing the cases – differences and 
similarities 
According to William James, a substantial as well as functional similarity between all 
religions can be seen in the fact that they ascribe some problem to the human condition (e.g. 
sin/ignorance/disloyalty, etc.), and their own creed and practices as the solution to said 
problem
295
 (e.g. salvation through Christ/cultivation of insight/loyal submission to Allah’s 
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commandments). In the case of mindfulness, christfulness and centering prayer, the adverse 
condition is the fact that we do not live in the present moment. The remedies for this are their 
practices, which are supposed to increase our capacity to “come back” and “remain” in the 
present. In this Jamesian sense, even mindfulness can be understood as religious, although if 
we based our definition on von Hügel’s theory of religion, there would be a need to prove the 
institutional and mystical elements of mindfulness before such status could be declared.  
The main difference between the cases, however, is undoubtedly the doctrinal and 
intellectual-speculative systems and rationalizations behind them. Whereas two are based on 
Christian metaphysics, the other (mindfulness) constitutes a mix of Buddhist, secular-
humanist, Daoist, Krishnamurtian, and Advaita-Vedanta inspired (i.e. non-dualistic) 
ontologies. This obviously affects the discourse within which the contemplative practices are 
presented and the ultimate aims they are oriented towards. 
It is the similarities, though, that stand out in the comparative study of the three cases. First, 
the proponents of these contemplative practices emphasize that they are not just for the “elect 
few” or some spiritual elite. Rather, these contemplative practices are open and accessible to 
anyone
296
 who searches for it. Thus, they offer a democratization of traditionally closed-in 
contemplative practices, now available and enthusiastically marketed to the world.  
Second, they represent both a system of practice (i.e. praxis) and also a way and process of 
life
297
. Third, there is focus on independence from the ordinary psychological realm of 
thoughts and emotions through de-objectification (christfulness)
298
 and detachment 
(mindfulness and centering prayer). One of the ingredients in accomplishing this 
independence is related to the fourth similarity, which is an emphasis on receptive, non-
concentrative effortless “presence,” through which one is further saturated in the present 
moment. This presence-ing is related and can lead to the fifth similarity, which is described as 
the revelation, realization or opening up to a new dimension of reality. Keating describes this 
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development as going from a black-and-white TV to full color – it is still the same picture, but 
it is greatly enhanced by the new dimension.
299
  
When it comes to the side-effects of the contemplative practices, the texts describe quite a 
few. The positive side-effects described in all three cases can include deep relaxation (both 
bodily and mental); the ability to distinguish between your thoughts and emotions on one 
side, and your “true self” one the other side; a loosening up of old ingrained habits, which is 
related to increased and noticeable tolerance for change and unexpected events.
300
 The 
negative side-effects can include unpleasantness (all three); loneliness and despair 
(Madsen)
301




Based on Brown’s typology of the stages of meditation303 mentioned in chapter 2, it is 
especially (3) and (4) – i.e. concentration with and without support, respectively – that is most 
interesting in the cases under study. While ethical and mind/body training preliminaries are 
mentioned
304
 and recommended, they are not emphasized much at all in the primary sources. 
Instead, the loci of focus are on the different ways concentration is cultivated. Also 
emphasized are the aims and supposed outcomes of practicing, which can be related to (5) and 
(6) of Brown’s typology.      
8.2 Aims 
The aim shared by all the cases is the removal of all the obstacles that trap our minds in the 
past or future, and separate us from the present moment and hence god’s ever-abiding 
presence (Keating and Madsen), or the reality of the moment (Kabat-Zinn). This is done by 
cultivating full and effortless present-mindedness through either of the practices. Another 
shared aim is the transformative component of the contemplative practice, although the forms 
of the transformation differ significantly. Practicing can supposedly lead to life-altering 
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transformations in the form of “divine union” (Keating)305, the redemption of humanity 
through Christ (Madsen)
306
, and insight into the unity, wholeness and connectedness of our 
minds and bodies (Kabat-Zinn)
307
.  
8.3 Objects of focus 
According to Eifring the objects of focus (or building blocks) for meditation can be separated 
into three categories: 1) “the location of the object, 2) the degree of agency of the meditator, 
and 3) the mental faculty (or faculties) involved in perceiving and producing the object.”308 
This works well for contemplative practices as well. In the case studies we find objects of 
focus that are bodily (contemplative/mindful walking
309
) and internally self-generated and 
spontaneous (centering prayer and mindfulness), affective (christfulness, and loving-kindness 
meditation in mindfulness), cognitive and sensory as well as both concentrative and non-
concentrative (all). The effortless non-directionality of focus, the notion of open monitoring, 
is emphasized most in mindfulness and centering prayer. These latter practices focus mostly 
on acceptance and a continuous coming-back-to the present moment, non-forcefully and 
gently using concentration and self-reminding (the sacred word in the case of centering 
prayer) as a gateway back to awareness. Christfulness, which is the newest and least 
conceptually developed praxis of the three cases, is more explicitly occupied with the 
cultivation of affective, sensory (especially visual and auditory) and the linguistic-symbolic 
features of contemplative objects of focus,  and thereby retains a more distinct 
Abrahamittic
310
 character.          
8.4 Buddha’s samadhi-trifecta 
There seems to be a tripartite view of the main ingredients needed for successful 
contemplation in several traditions. According to the Anguttaranikaya
311
 of the Pali canon, 
Buddha Shakyamuni supposedly stated that a heightened or noble mind should make his mind 
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flexible and conducive for the spiritual path by cultivating three contemplative modalities – 
uplifting energy (paggaha), equanimity (upekkha), and concentration (samadhi). The sutra 
goes on to compare contemplative training with the work of a goldsmith. It is not enough to 
just develop equanimity as this might invite lethargy, nor just cultivating uplifted energy, as 
this alone easily causes tension. The perfect combination and harmonization of this tripartite 
schema is the way to go to make one’s mind pliable and easy to work with, according to the 
sutra. These resemble the three last members of the eightfold path of Buddhism, which are 
mental effort (vyayama), mindfulness (smrti) and concentration (samadhi), collectively called 
samadhi in the Buddhist tradition. These are also reminiscent of the three last “limbs” of yoga 
explicated in the third part of the Yogasutra
312
, namely dharana (concentration or attention on 
an object), dhyana (exclusive and sustained focus on an object) and samadhi (here defined as 
identity with the object of concentration, and the highest stage of these three limbs)
313
. 
Perfectly mastered and combined, these three last limbs of yoga described in the Yogasutra 
make up what is called samyama, which is the exclusive focused identification with a specific 
object for concentration. The Yogasutra goes on to describe how the state of samyama can be 
applied for gaining supernatural powers, and the passage mentioned above from the 
Anguttaranikaya goes on to describe similar powers also
314
.        
The interesting thing here, however, is the fact that mindfulness, centering prayer, and 
christfulness to a lesser but still arguable degree, all follow a similar tripartite scheme. For 
mindfulness, all its forms include a degree of relaxation and concentration, and for the 
advanced stages of it, choiceless awareness
315
 is introduced. For Keating, centering prayer 
involves relaxation, kataphatic and (if one is successful) apophatic contemplation. Kataphatic 
contemplation means the use and proper preparation of the rational faculties (like memory), 
while apophatic contemplation means “resting in God beyond concepts and particular acts.”316 
The kataphatic practices (like using the sacred word to re-establish oneself in awareness of the 
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present moment) lead to apophatic contemplation, “which in turn is sustained through 
appropriate kataphatic practices.”317 There is also a three-fold separation in classical 
contemplative prayer in lectio divina, which consists of meditatio, oratio and contemplatio
318
 
(which according to Keating were three necessary aspects of one practice before it was 
separated in the wake of the post-Reformation era). Christfulness practices also include 
relaxation, concentration and the cultivation of what Madsen calls “stillness,” in which he 
occasionally experiences listening to the voice of Christ
319
. There is also a presence-exercise 
(nærværsøvelse)
320
 where the emphasis is first finding stillness through calming the body, 
then letting go of everything, detaching from thoughts and everything else that might be 
distracting. Interestingly, there seems to be a cross-cultural focus on relaxation and 
peacefulness, focus and control, then a “letting go” of control and a simultaneous effortless 
and spontaneous awareness that is receptive to change and which can somehow go deeper into 
the recesses of the psyche
321
. The ideal of contemplative practices, as systems of regulatory 
attention, appears to be coherent when it comes to the ingredients that need to be put together 
in the alchemical process of the contemplative laboratory to transmute the iron of a messy 
habitual inner life to the dynamic golden inner structure of the contemplative practitioner. 
This will probably remain as an ideal for most people though, as even highly experienced 
veterans of practice must concur to a quite messy and habitual-oriented inner life. In either 
case, despite applying different words and technologies for achieving attentional control and 
contemplative development, I conclude on the basis of my own understanding of the three 
contemplative practices and the manuals that explicate them, that there are three “moods” or 
ingredients for successful contemplation. These are relaxation (peacefulness), concentration 
(bringing one’s attention towards one point), and awareness (maintaining an open attention 
towards the external and internal impressions of one’s being). They are necessary as they 
enhance the practitioner’s experience of the present moment. Brought together and 
harmonized, these three components could constitute what von Hügel called “multiplicity 
                                                 
317
 (Keating 2002, 123) 
318
 “They were interwoven one into the other. Like the angels ascending and descending on Jacob’s ladder, 
one’s attention was expected to go up and down the ladder of consciousness.” (Keating 2002, 21) 
319
 (Madsen 2012, 14) 
320
 (Madsen 2012, 36) 
321
 The scientific research (although incipient and inconclusive) on meditation seems to suggest that “open 
monitoring”-techniques of contemplation represent a more difficult and advanced stage of contemplative 
practice, and the traditional understanding of contemplation seem to concur. Still, at this end of the spectrum 
is where we find the focal point of many contemplative practices today, also others not mentioned in this 
study. See (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson 2007)   
88 
 
within unity” – a continuous interplay of three opposing yet related modalities that enhance 
and strengthen mental flexibility.           
 
8.5 Mental flexibility and de-conceptualization 
Through such abovementioned training of mental flexibility, the different contemplative 
practices can seemingly make its practitioners experience what the primary sources refer to as 
“resting in God” (Keating), “being permeated by Christ” (Madsen), or establishing a “full 
way of being” (Kabat-Zinn). Through balancing the three main modalities of attention, mental 
flexibility, and hence pliability, is thought to occur. Such practicing also elicits a process of 
de-conceptualization according to the sources
322
, which is supported by independent sources 
as well
323
. The process of de-conceptualization can involve a movement from “content” to 
“process” (e.g. in mindfulness, seeing mental phenomena as constantly changing and 
interrelated instead of as separate); alterations or even the collapse of the ordinary sense of 
self (all); significant changes in worldview (all, might more accurately be called re-
conceptualization); an increased feeling of freedom from reactivity and activity regarding 
observable objects, both inner and outer (all); and systematic deconstruction of some of the 
structures of ordinary consciousness (all), like attitudes and behavioral schemes, thinking, 
perception, self-system, and time-space matrix.
324
    
    
8.6 Paradoxical language games 
There is another vitally important element that stands out from the primary sources, and it 
concerns their usage of language. There are basically two paradoxes that arise out of the 
practice and interpretation of the three contemplative practices: 1) – the texts all stress the 
non-technicality and non-doing aspects of the practices and the importance of not being 
preoccupied with the goal, while still being actual technical manuals that are both pre-
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scriptive and de-scriptive. After all, what is a technique, or indeed any contemplative practice, 
if it does not pertain to a specific goal? And 2) – the emphasis on non-discursive non-
concentrative techniques might, upon closer philosophical scrutiny, turn out to be discursive 
after all.  
Starting with the latter paradox, how can we be sure that a somehow unlanguaged inner state 
is happening while we are practicing? Contemplatives like Keating argue that non-doing and 
gentle accepting leads to his (darksome) apophatic contemplation, which necessarily must go 
through the gates of (lightsome) kataphatic contemplation before reaching the darksome 
stage. In other words, discursive and concentrative methods are indeed necessary even in 
these contemplative practices, but the evolution of the practice – and this is crucial according 
to Keating – should lead to an effortless, presence-oriented receiving. The use of the sacred 
word in the case of centering prayer demonstrates that the practitioner initiates a kind of inner 
self-dialogue, an asymmetrical self-doubling
325
 where the dialogue is held between the 
practitioner’s distracted self and his idealized higher Other. Would not the application of the 
sacred word, however gently it is used, be a form of self-instruction, and hence a private 
language game that necessarily is concentrative, discursive and linguistic by its nature? If this 
is true, is it even possible to remove oneself from such private language games completely? 





 during the course of a practice – letting go of the sense of self, of all kinds of 
external stimuli and aspirations – a form of omni-forgetting. This relates to the perennialist-
contextualist debate in mysticism research, where Foreman argues that one distinct cross-
cultural similarity between mystical techniques and doctrines is their insistence on a 




As to the former paradox, it basically boils down to this: how can non-action lead to change, 
and how does a technique “transcend” itself and move beyond its own parameters? How does 
using a technique help towards a movement beyond that same technique? This paradoxicality 
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of non-doing and non-technicality characterizes all the three contemplative practices in 
various degrees. Based on my own experience with these practices, I would argue that the 
paradox or mystery (hiddenness) of using contemplative practices non-technically can best be 
understood by von Hügel’s Experimental-Emotional-Intuitive element of religion, and my 
own term of technical mysticism. In brief: by experimenting with practices for inner 
transformation (technical mysticism), the need for the three modalities of mental flexibility 
mentioned above becomes clear. Relaxation, concentration and awareness are related 
processes that directly affect attention, as they all enhance one’s experience of the present 
moment. Intellectual analysis of these processes alone is not sufficient for understanding their 
practical application in contemplative practice. There is a clear intellectual component to one-
pointed focus (concentration), and the mental attitude accompanying it can be described as 
narrow, suppressive and forceful. Awareness however, (defined as a more diffuse, non-
directed open type of focus) has a clear non-concentrative intuitive element, and is conversely 
accompanied by an inclusive and effortless mental attitude
329
. To reach awareness, however, 
the practitioner usually needs to apply concentration and relaxation, unless it happens 
spontaneously. Then, when deep focus and a sense of calmness is established, the practitioner 
can move on into non-directed focus (awareness), which entails a sort of “forgetting” of 
concentration objects and a deeper “resting” in the present moment. Exactly what such 
“forgetting” and “resting” entail must be experienced and experimented with through practice, 
as it is not a clearly delineated process. The psychological torrent of mental and emotional 
impressions and memories that drag away the attention of the contemplative practitioner is 
evidence enough of the need for a non-linear approach. What is needed is the application of 
more relaxation, concentration or awareness according to the nature of the distractions. If 
tension is a problem, relaxation must be re-established. Tension might arise from an overly 
forced concentration, which means the need for more awareness, leading to relaxation. 
“Resting” in awareness can suddenly collapse into day-dreaming, which signals the need for 
more concentration. The proper appliance of the three modalities will then produce an 
acceptance and tolerance for the state of extreme complexity and enormous flux that 
characterizes the experience of the present moment. Therefore, the practitioner’s response to 
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his experience of the present moment and all of its distractions is something too spontaneous 
to be pinned down to linearly categorized methodology
330
.   
As such, I would argue that the source materials’ emphasis on non-technicality does not 
necessarily translate to an outright denial of technical practice (as this would be self-
contradictory and paradoxical). Rather, they can be seen as admonitions to avoid excessive 
goal-orientation and passive reliance on techniques
331
, which is considered by all three as a 
great hindrance in the contemplative practice. 
 
8.7 The poietic element – what is “brought forth” 
The source material is quite clear as to the effects of contemplative practice. For Keating, 
centering prayer brings about an “unloading of consciousness”332 and at more advanced 
stages, “freedom from cultural conditioning.”333 Kabat-Zinn writes about the healing powers 
of MBSR and its accentuating of greater self-regulation, connectedness and acceptance of 
change
334
. For Madsen, christfulness can bring about “the disentanglement (opbrud) of old 
habits” and a “partaking of divine nature (delaktighed i guddommelig natur).”335 What is 
brought forth through these practices is a change of habits and greater self-knowledge, 
according to the sources. 
Based on von Hügel’s theory, the primary source material can be interpreted as mystical. This 
is because they extrapolate processes of inner transformation through experimentation, and 
focus on lived and felt aspects of their doctrines. Further, there is an interesting and clear 
operative element at play in all three cases, which is yet another of Hügel’s contributions to 
the study of mysticism. Contrary to traditional understanding of contemplation and mysticism 
as exclusively innerwordly and reclusive, Hügel identified as part of the mystical the 
operative and volitional elements present among contemplatives throughout the ages. This can 
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be seen in our database: Keating describes how contemplation necessarily impels us to action 
according to our circumstances and abilities.
336
 Keating himself founded Contemplative 
Outreach, an international ecumenical organization dedicated to the dissemination of 
centering prayer. Although being a Trappist monk, he is also active in hosting retreats 
throughout the year
337
. Madsen is actively spreading christfulness through seminars, online-
courses, lectures and city-retreats
338
. Additionally, he emphasizes how christfulness can help 
its practitioners see Christ in others
339
, thereby treating them better, and in extension creating 
a better world. Kabat-Zinn points out how the way of awareness and new understandings of 
connectedness can bring about greater changes both individually and societally
340
. He is also 
occupied with spreading MBSR research and teaching. Thus, I would argue that the three 
contemplative cases comply with Kaelber’s fifth category of asceticism mentioned in chapter 
two
341
, namely asceticism as transformer of culture. In short, based on the source material, it 
is clear that contemplative practice does not necessitate nor effect an exclusively passive 
disposition. On the contrary, it seems to stimulate an operative element that can easily 
translate into activism of various kinds.    
 
8.8 Experience-dependent neuroplasticity and inner 
transformation 
According to Lutz et al., some neuroscientific research seems to suggest that many core mental 
processes, like awareness, attention, emotion regulation (including our capacity for happiness 
and compassion) can best be conceptualized as trainable skills
342
. This is related to the concept 
of neuroplasticity, which can be defined as: “the malleability of the brain, observable as 
changes in neuronal structure and connectivity, typically as a consequence of influence outside 
of the brain.”343 This definition hinges on two properties: activity-dependence and changes in 
                                                 
336
 (Keating 2002, 228-235) 
337
 (Keating 2002, 122) 
338
 (Madsen 2012, 44) 
339
 (Madsen 2012, 4, 24-30) 
340
 (Kabat-Zinn 2004, 149-234, 396-420) 
341
 Kaelber defined the ascetic’s relation to culture in five categories. See (Kaelber 1995, 324-328)  
342
 (Lutz, Dunne, and Davidson 2007, 545) 
343





. In other words, this concept of neuroplasticity seems to confirm what many 
philosophers and contemplatives have maintained since antiquity: habits, what we repeatedly 
do, determine who we are and what we become. Or as the neuroscientist would say: neurons 
that fire together, wire together. If this holds true, then changing habits would necessarily mean 
that one can change oneself. Seen in this perspective, it seems plausible that contemplative 
practice can be very effective for inner transformation, given that it is practiced on a regular 
basis to initiate a sustained change in neural activity. If this hypothesis holds true, then the 
scientific study of contemplative practice could lead to new insights relevant for psychology, 
medicine, neuroscience, philosophy, and religious studies.  
Neuroplasticity has become a popular kitsch term these days, but it is important to remember 
that there still are a lot of discrepancies concerning neuroscientists’ understanding of the brain 
generally and neuroplasticity specifically. One such discrepancy is the issue of sudden inner 
transformation, like a mystical experience. According to the current prevailing understanding 
of neuroplasticity, structural neuronal changes cannot occur out of the blue – it takes time and 
repeated stimulus for that to happen. How then can one explain a momentary experience 
resulting in a lifetime of change? It seems unlikely that the nerve cells could break old 
connections and make new ones in such short period of time. Newberg suggest that one 
possible answer to this could be the existence of unused, inactivated neural connections that 
might somehow be activated and overpower the existing neural connections. If this is the case, 
we could argue that everyone inhibits the potential for transformative experiences. However, 
no research has to date been able to find such connections
345
. Neuroscientific studies of 
contemplative practices are still in their early phases of working out effective methodologies, 
and the brain is still the most complex object of study known to man. It is prudent, therefore, to 
view neuroscientific research on contemplative practice as indicative rather than conclusive
346
. 
Still, the current predominating views on neuroplasticity could explain why long-term 
practitioners of contemplative practice seem to go through similar experiences and develop 
similar abilities (like the ones mentioned above). Nevertheless, if we assume that 
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neuroplasticity works, and that mental processes like happiness and empathy are best 
conceptualized as trainable skills, then contemplative practice can be understood as a catalyst 
for inner transformation. Following this line of thinking, and the source material from part II, I 
want to emphasize the potential converse effects of this hypothesis. If it is true that mental 
qualities (e.g. empathy) can be strengthened by habitual behavior (contemplative training, 
emphatic deeds, etc.), then weakening such qualities through habitual behavior should also be 
possible. As seen above, Keating, Madsen and Kabat-Zinn have warned against certain side-
effects that can occur in association with contemplative practice. Keating e.g. underlines how 
important it is for the contemplative practitioner to cultivate habits of service to others and to 
god to balance the experiences that arise out of contemplative practice
347
. Further, there are 
people who claim that they have consciously practiced and successfully weakened their 
emphatic sensibilities through contemplative training. The most notorious example to come to 
mind is the Norwegian terrorist A. Behring Breivik, responsible for the 22. July Oslo bombings 
and shootings on Utøya in 2011, which killed 77 people. To prepare for the terrorist attack, 
Breivik claims in his manifesto that he started a process of de-socialization in 2006, consisting 
of a training regimen of meditation and philosophizing for 40 minutes on an almost daily basis. 
During these sessions, he claims he would perform a “mental simulation of the operation”348 
and self-indoctrination. In 2012, during the trial, he further stated that he started a form of 
“Bushido-meditation”349 in 2006, and was practicing this regularly as preparation. There are 
reasons to believe that these claims found both in the manifesto and during the trial are false, 
being simply the attempt of a terrorist to present himself in a self-orchestrated favorable 
light
350
. Whether they are true or not, however, is beside the point. The point of my 
argumentation is that such a development of consciously weakening mental processes like 
compassion, tolerance, etc., could be possible, theoretically, if the converse is possible. The 
implications of this would then be that inner transformation that is long-lasting is indeed 
possible through contemplative training. But the ability to effect inner transformation, if this is 
even possible, could be a double-edged sword.              
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8.9 Conclusion: Master key or just deep relaxation? 
In chapter 3, I defined contemplative practice as any self-administered attention-based 
operation or procedure producing deep relaxation, and which provides or improves the actor’s 
qualification for the next performance of the same operation, ultimately aiming for inner 
transformation. It is general enough to fit all three cases from part II, yet specific enough to 
make it useful as an analytical category. The definition highlights the most important aspects 
of contemplative practice: namely its focus on attention-regulation, relaxation, repetition, and 
inner transformation. By including inner transformation, the definition accounts for the 
comparable reports from different contemplative narratives of its effects in changing habits, 
lifestyle, and self-image. In this sense contemplative practice can be seen as a master key to 
metacognition, initiating a process of self-discovery and wonder as to one’s own capacity for 
growth and learning. This is arguably the most attractive component of contemplative 
practice. This positive notion of the transformative power of contemplative practice is further 
substantiated by neuroscientific discourses that emphasize the brain’s plasticity and ability to 
change through repeated and self-directed stimuli. 
However, there is arguably only one thing that has been proven scientifically beyond any 
reasonable doubt concerning contemplative practices: their positive effects on relaxation
351
. 
Everything else – whether it is the effects of brain plasticity, treatment for depression, 
increased memory, etc. – is still not validated by enough research to account as evidence for 
its effectiveness
352
 or establish indisputable causal relationships. 
Based on practitioners’ reports, it is clear that contemplative practice is not only a pleasant 
exploration of one’s mind and psychological faculties, but also a sometimes difficult and 
scary endeavor. It is often presented as gradual and hard, but worth bearing the pain if one 
perseveres through the difficulties. An analogy to contemplative practice that clarifies its 
relation to techne might be pregnancy: something new is produced through participatory 
means and cultivated over a period of time, but it is not always pleasant. The process can in 
some cases be dangerous. However, the end result is well worth the pain and agony. In this 
sense, it is clear that contemplative practice is best approached by evaluating its meaning for 
the individual, which is best done through participatory – i.e. technical – means. Whether 
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understood as a master key to great wonders or simply an effective relaxation exercise, 
contemplative practice is best conceptualized as techne insofar as it is seen as a craft or art of 
personal development (mental, emotional, spiritual, etc.). Techne underlines the most 
essential aspect of contemplative practice: that there is in fact something we can do to bring 







9 Criticism and Techne 
In the last chapter I examined techne’s relevance for the individual by relating it to 
contemplative practice. In this chapter, I will start out by briefly considering techne’s relation 
to society through the process I have called technification. From this starting point, the 
discussion will evolve into some critical perspectives on the research I have presented in this 
dissertation. The two main issues examined through the source material so far have been: to 
what extent is techne related to contemplative practice, and how do the sources explain and 
justify their emphasis on the technical aspect of their teachings? 
9.1  Technification as reductionism 
I have defined technification as a process where the mystical-experimental elements of 
religion predominate at the expense of the institutional and the intellectual. I argue that this 
can come about as a reaction to the other elements, or to competing kinds of mystical-
experimental expressions. Our source material can be seen in this light: mindfulness as an 
extensive continuation of the technification process initiated by the convergence of Western 
romantic expectations mingling with Asian Buddhist reform leaders during the last century; 
christfulness as a reaction to the success of mindfulness and the general secular disposition of 
Scandinavian culture; centering prayer as a response to Vatican II’s admonitions to 
reinvigorate and bring back the Christian contemplative tradition following a half-millennia 
long disrepute within the Catholic Church. However, it is important to distinguish my etic 
interpretations from their emic perspectives: Keating and Madsen are very clear that their 
practices should not be done to the exclusion of other communal aspects like church-
attendance, charity, etc., of Christian life. Kabat-Zinn on the other hand continuously stresses 
the need for wholeness and balance, for integrating mindfulness practice into daily life, and is 
arguably more technically oriented. It would be too simplistic to assume that religion or 
contemplation can be fully explicated through techne alone, both emically and etically. 
Hence, I do not agree with Sloterdijk’s claim that there never existed “religions” but rather 
immunological systems of training “captured” through the rhetoric of so-called “religious” 
specialists
353
. I do agree with von Hügel however, that the technical side must be seen 
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together with the other main elements in any comprehensive analysis, whether it is of 
contemplative practice or religion.        
9.2 The adaptability of contemplative practice 
Technification can be revealing in another sense, namely in how it works as a “rebrander” or 
adaptive force, for contemplative practices in this case, to suit the needs of the 
contemplative/religious market. With christfulness a deliberate rebranding takes place. Recall 
Keating’s explanation of the compartmentalization of lectio divina that occurred during 
especially the 16
th
-century, and his crediting of Saint Ignatius for “saving” an important part 
of contemplative tradition by adapting contemplative practices into ones adjusted to the needs 
of the times. The success of MBSR, and Kabat-Zinn’s “translational” work of adapting 
Buddhist notions to a psychologized language, is probably the best case example of 
contemplative adaptability. In this context, technification might beneficially be included in 
the (post)secularization debate. The case of MBSR is illustrative: here is a set of 
contemplative practices that originally came from religious spheres, gaining popularity in 
secularized
354
 countries of the West, so much so that they are appearing in public spheres (e.g. 
healthcare and education)
355
 where the influence of religion was thought to be clearly 
delimited. This seems to go against Weber’s notion of disenchantment. Therefore it might be 
worth examining the relationship between the societal and individual dimensions of 
secularization
356
 on the one hand and technification on the other, and whether technification 
can be understood as a part of or reaction to secularization
357
.  
9.3 Practice as Problem 
In relation to reductionism, a strong objection to my comparative approach in this study could 
be that by comparing the technical, participatory and enactive elements of contemplative 
practice – i.e., interpreting it through the lens of techne – I have downplayed the importance 
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of socio-cultural context. Such elements can arguably mean just as much, or possibly even 
more, for the effects and meanings attributed to contemplative practices, compared to the 
technical features. I have, however, contextualized the cases studied by tracing the origin and 
contemporary landscape wherein they exist. My choice of focusing on techne stems from the 
expectation that such an approach could reveal aspects of the practices that might not be clear 
through a process of phenomenological bracketing and historical readings alone. After all, 
texts describing contemplative practices can often be normative and prescriptive rather than 
descriptive
358
, and it can be next to impossible to know whether they are talking about 
practices, the effects of practices, or mental states
359
. It is therefore better to use contemporary 
practice manuals if we want more specificity about the practices involved. Applying a techne-
oriented approach would make it clearer whether a manual for a contemplative practice is in 
fact describing a practice, or something else. Such an approach would entail blurring the line 
between the emic and the etic regarding contemplative practice.  
9.4 Conclusion: Techne as movement between emic 
and etic perspectives  
My practice of contemplative techniques as a method of participant observation could be 
criticized for being apologetic and essentialist. In the last chapter I did e.g. choose to focus 
more on the similarities between the practices than the differences, as this was how I 
increasingly came to view them through my practicing and re-reading of the source material – 
as similar (but not identical) systems of contemplative development. One response to such 
critique would be that the techne-orientation applied in this study must be inherently reflexive 
if it is to produce valuable results. By participating in the very object of this study by 
practicing contemplative techniques, and applying techne as a research category, I have 
effectually situated myself in a movement between emic and etic perspectives.  The two main 
characteristics of my conception of techne are its poietic (i.e. revelatory and creative) nature 
and its harmonizing and intermediary nature between the practical and the theoretical. I find 
techne to be one of the most profound concepts of Greek history, as it attests to the living 
spontaneous reality of phenomena, and how one should relate to them – not through mere 
analysis or synthesis, but rather through the continuous artful harmonization of both. 
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Therefore, both as a technical concept related to lifestyle and as a research category, I believe 
techne is greatly suited as an analytical tool for the study of religion. Being in a state of flux 
between observation-near (emic) and observation-distant (etic) perspectives, I would argue 
that my techne-orientation implies considerable reflexivity. It is never constant, and therefore 
closer to living phenomena than any categorization.  
Finally, the question of validity and reliability must be raised: How valid is my comparison 
between the three contemplative techniques? Although technically similar, the sources apply 
different concepts and represent different ontologies. Despite this, I argue that the similarities 
in aims, motivations, side-effects, technicalities within the practices, and the neurobiological 
effects validate such a comparison. My definition of contemplative practice concurred well 
with all three cases. This does not mean, however, that I can generalize about all 
contemplative practices based on the things I uncovered about the three under study. Indeed, 
comparative work can be criticized for being insensitive to contexts, or for being too 
essentializing. My admittedly wide definition of contemplative practice might prove to be too 
wide after closer scrutiny. Nevertheless, it proved to be sufficient for my main research task 
throughout this dissertation, which was to examine the relation between techne and 








10 Conclusion: Contemplative practice 
as techne 
This somewhat unusual study has been an attempt to use an ancient concept, techne, to shed 
light and hopefully new insights on contemplative practice. The underlying research question 
has been: to what extent can contemporary contemplative practices be understood as a form of 
techne? In case the meaning of techne is still unclear, the question can be rephrased like this: 
to what extent can contemporary contemplative practices be understood as a form of creative 
and harmonizing art or craft? To answer this question, I have mainly relied on the theories of 
von Hügel, Sloterdijk, and Eifring, and many others have been consulted in the course of the 
investigation. Based on the research literature of asceticism, mysticism and partly 
neuroscience, I developed the following definition of contemplative practice: any self-
administered attention-based operation or procedure producing deep relaxation, and that 
provides or improves the actor’s qualification for the next performance of the same operation, 
ultimately aiming for inner transformation. Having shown that this definition worked with the 
three cases studied, I believe it can be applied as a heuristic in terms of other contemplative 
practices as well. I have operated with concepts like technification and technical mysticism 
based on the theories of von Hügel, and maintain that these concepts could deserve further 
elaboration and investigation. Technification, as a process of contemplative-religious 
adaptivity throughout history, could possibly be used to deepen our understanding of 
secularization. Technical mysticism, defined as training and experimenting with practices of 
inner transformation, could be a useful category for studying certain types of contemplatives 
who focus exclusively on the transformative aspects of their training.      
Through my analysis of mindfulness, christfulness and centering prayer, I have tried to show 
throughout the study how techne and the process of contemplative practice are deeply related. 
I have implicitly argued that contemplative practice in the most certain degree can be 
understood as a form of techne. Von Hügel’s “multiplicity within unity” is an apt description 
of techne – it is both an ability to respond to complexity and a movement between the 
particular and the general, the close-by and the distant, the emic and the etic. Likewise, I 
would argue that contemplative practice represents both an ability to respond to complexity, 
and a movement through different perspectives. They both represent intermediary positions, 
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